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ROCK-A-BYE LAWSUIT: CAN A BABY SUE
THE HAND THAT ROCKED THE CRADLE?
INTRODUCTION

In its original state, the parental tort immunity doctrine
protected parents from liability for acts that resulted in injury to
their child.' A child thus could not sue a parent for any tortious
act, intentional or negligent.2 However, since its adoption, the
doctrine has undergone significant changes. 3
While almost all states now allow children to sue a parent for
any intentional tort,4 states have greatly varied in their approach
to immunity in negligence actions.5 Ambiguous definitions of immune conduct have resulted in inconsistent application of the
doctrine. Consequently, the doctrine has lead to inequitable re-

1. David L. Grobart, Comment, Parent-Child Tort Immunity in Illinois, 17
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 303, 320 (1986). It is important to note that the immunity doc-

trine is also termed the "parent-child immunity doctrine." This doctrine precludes
any tort action by a child against a parent or a parent against a child. This Note
concentrates on tort actions brought by a child only and does not address tort actions brought by the parent.
The word "child" in this Note refers to a person under 18 years of age who is
unemancipated.
Complete emancipation ... removes the bar to actions between parent and
child for personal torts .... Complete emancipation occurs by act of the parent when he surrenders all right to the services and earning of the child, as
well as the right to the custody and control of his person ....

Complete

emancipation arises by operation of law irrespective of the parent's consent
when a child marries,... when the child becomes twenty-one years old....

for] when the parent abandons or fails to support the child ....
Gilliken v. Burbage, 139 S.E.2d 753, 757-58 (N.C. 1965).
Moreover, the term "injury" specifically refers to physical injuries, not emotional or psychological injuries.
2. See Meece v. Holland Furnace Co., 269 Ill. App. 164, 169 (Ill. App. Ct. 1933)
(stating 'lilt is a rule of common law that a child cannot sue his father in tort unless a right of action is authorized by statute").
3. Martin J. Rooney & Colleen M. Rooney, ParentalTort Immunity: Spare The
Liability, Spoil The Parent, 25 NEw ENG. L. REv. 1161, 1166 (1991). "No uniform
rule now exists within the United States on the issue of parental tort immunity."
Id.
4. See, e.g., Nudd v. Matsoukas, 131 N.E.2d 525, 531 (Ill. 1956). "While this
policy might be such justification to prevent suits for mere negligence within the
scope of the parental relationship we do not conceive that public policy should prevent a minor from obtaining redress for wilful and wanton misconduct on the part
of a parent." Id.
5. Rooney & Rooney, supra note 3, at 1166.
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sults, often protecting undeserving parents and simultaneously
leaving deserving and injured children-victims without a remedy.
Moreover, these problems are adversely affecting several other
types of suits. Simply put, parental tort immunity, in any form, is
unjustifiable in present day American jurisprudence, due to inequitable and inconsistent results.
Accordingly, this Note critically analyzes the parental tort
immunity doctrine, and specifically addresses its most recent
effect in Illinois. Further, this Note concludes that states should
abolish the parental tort immunity doctrine and determine liability using the modern-day "reasonableness" standard. Part I of this
Note explains the introduction of the doctrine into the American
courts and. describes Illinois' current approach to parental immunity. Part II illustrates problems inherent to the immunity doctrine, specifically recognizing Illinois' recent decision of Cates v.
Cates' as illustrative of these problems. Part II also analyzes
current legislative and judicial substitutes employed by other
states to address parental tort immunity. Finally, Part III concludes with recommendations for a model statute, as well as a
proposal that states, like Illinois, adopt a pattern jury instruction
invoking the standard of reasonableness as a replacement to parental immunity.
I. PARENTAL TORT IMMUNITY IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE

The idea of parental immunity dates back to the Roman
empire.7 However, it was not until 1891 that the American judicial system adopted the parental tort immunity doctrine.' In response to increased children's rights, American courts developed a
doctrine which bars children from suing their parents.? Initially
following its creation, a large majority of states instantly adopted
the doctrine.' ° However, states have subsequently split into four
groups in the application of the doctrine. Therefore, this section
first explains the introduction of parental tort immunity into the
American judicial system. This section then explains the four approaches taken by different states regarding negligent torts. Lastly, this section specifically addresses Illinois' approach to parental

6. Cates v. Cates, 619 N.E.2d 715 (Ill. 1993).
7. Gail D. Hollister, Parent-ChildImmunity: A Doctrine in Search of Justification, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 490 (1982).
8. Hewellette v. George, 9 So. 885, 885-86 (Miss. 1891). In Hewellette, a parent
had her child committed to an insane asylum without just reason to do so. Id. The
child later brought a claim against her mother for false imprisonment. Id. The Mississippi Supreme Court barred the claim under parental tort immunity. Id. at 887.
9. Id. at 887. (recognizing the creation of parental tort immunity doctrine).
10. Rooney & Rooney, supra note 3, at 1162-63. See infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text for a list of the states that continue to recognize the doctrine.
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tort immunity in negligence actions.
A. The Introduction Of ParentalTort Immunity Into American
Courts
Prior to 1891, the doctrine of parental tort immunity did not
exist in American jurisprudence." In early Roman law, a child
was a member of a single family unit. 2 The head of the family
unit, usually the eldest male, had the responsibility of authority
and discipline over the family. 3 Because of the broad discretion
for authority allowed to the family head, he was not liable for any

injuries that resulted." Further, since children could not legally
hold title to property or money, any compensatory damages

awarded to the child would necessarily revert back to that very
family head, the tortfeasor. 5
As English common law developed, children's rights expanded. 6 Children acquired the rights of owning property and maintaining causes of actions for a variety of torts. 7 However, there
is no record of any personal tort actions between a parent and a
child in early English law.' Moreover, no specific law barred
children from suing their parents. Nonetheless, it was generally
recognized that a parent had total discretion in how to discipline a
child.' Accordingly, common law civil courts were reluctant to

11. Cates v. Cates, 619 N.E.2d 715, 718 (Ill. 1993).
12. See Hollister, supra note 7, at 490.
13. Id. In fact, early Roman society favored strict disciplinary techniques and
severe punishments. Id. at 491 (citing Judith Areen, Intervention Between Parent
and Child: A Reappraisalof the State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63
GEO. L.J. 887, 908-909 (1975)). Parental authority over children had no set limits.
For example, state statutes in both Massachusetts and Connecticut during the
1600's sentenced a child 17 or over to death if he cursed, struck, or rebelled against
a parent. Id. at 491.
14. Id. at 490. "ITihe head of the family.., had nearly total power over the
children in the family unit. He possessed not only the power to alienate the child,
but also control over the child's life and death." Id.
15. Id.
16. Rooney & Rooney, supra note 3, at 1162. "At common law, a child was never
considered a part of its parent's identity. Unlike a wife, a child did not suffer from
a unity of legal identity with either parent. Thus the child was free to sue or be
sued, in contract or tort, law or equity, in his or her own right, unlike his married
mother." Id.
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G cmt. a (1979); Samuel Mark

Pipino, Comment, In Whose Best Interest? Exploring the Continuing Viability of the
Parental Immunity Doctrine, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1111, 1111 (1992); RESTATEMENT
(SEcOND) OF TORTS § 895G cmt. a (1979).

18. Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648, 649 (Cal. 1971); William E. McCurdy, Torts
Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1030, 1059-60 (1930).
19. See Hollister, supra note 7, at 491-92. However, parents were subjected to
criminal sanctions for excessive force and abuse. Id. (citing T. COOLEY, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 123, at 259-60 (5th ed. 1930)).
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interfere with the family relationship and question the parent's
choices and methods of discipline.2 °
In 1891, the Mississippi Supreme Court became the first
American court to create the immunity doctrine prohibiting a
child from suing a parent for injuries. 2' Even though the Mississippi Supreme Court created the doctrine without any prior authority,22 two courts quickly followed with similar holdings.'
These three court decisions became known as the "Great Trilogy.,24 In justifying the complete bar from compensation, the
"Great Trilogy" delineated six underlying rationales: (1) the maintenance of peace and harmony within the family unit;25 (2) the
20. Id. at 490-91. Parents were presumed to have had acted fairly and correctly
and were only subject to criminal penalties if several criteria were met. Most notably, the parent must have "acted with malice or had inflicted permanent injury."
Id. at 492. Moreover, the child must overcome the presumption of fair conduct on

the part of the parent. Id. (citing W. TIFFANY, HANDBOOK
AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS 264-65 (2d ed. 1909)).

ON THE LAW OF PERSONS

Few criminal prosecutions were brought against parents for mistreating
their children, but in those that were instituted, the court recognized wide
parental discretion. For example, in 1837 in a case where parents had
punched their child, pushed her head against the wall, switched her, tied
her to the bed for two hours and hit her with cowhide, the court held that
the reasonableness of the actions was a question for the jury. Johnson v.
State, 21 Tenn. 282, 284 (Tenn. 1837). Some fifty years later the North Carolina Supreme Court held that a father who had hit his daughter 30 times
with a "small limb," choked her until her tongue hung out of her mouth and
threw her violently to the ground, thereby dislocating her thumb, could not
be held criminally liable. State v. Jones, 95 N.C. 488, 491-92 (N.C. 1837)
Id. at 492 n.26. To this day, some jurisdictions still believe that criminal prosecution is the only proper legal deterrent to parental misconduct. Pipino, supra note
17, at 1125 n.76.
21. See Hewellette v. George, 9 So. 885, 887 (Miss. 1891). A Michigan Appellate
Court noted, "[tihe doctrine of parental immunity from tort actions by their...
children seems to have been brought into the legal world in [Hewellette v.
George].... This case has been the parent of absurdity." Rodebaugh v. Grand
Trunk W.R.R., 145 N.W.2d 401, 403 (Mich. Ct. App. 1966).
22. Hollister, supra note 7, at 493-94.
23. McKelvey v. McKelvey, 77 S.W. 664 (Tenn. 1903). The Tennessee Supreme
Court analogized parent-child immunity to husband-wife immunity; the community
required and expected both the wife and the child to be obedient to the husband/father. Id. at 665. Any injury which resulted from punishment due to a child's
lack of obedience did not constitute a cause of action. Id. at 664. The court held
that a child may not maintain an action against a father for alleged cruel disciplinary punishment. Id. Furthermore, courts considered a suit by a child against a
parent as a suit against the child's own family entity. See Pipino, supra note 17, at
1112.
Similarly, in Roller v. Roller, 79 P. 788 (Wash. 1905), a daughter brought a
cause of action against her father for rape. The Roller court compared parent-child
immunity with spousal immunity and determined that public policy conflicts with
the possibility of a child suing a parent. Id. at 789. Thus, the court also adopted
parental tort immunity. Id.
24. Hollister, supra note 7, at 494; Pipino, supra note 17, at 1112.
25. Pipino, supra note 17, at 1112 (citing Hewellette, 9 So. at 887); Rooney &
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parent's need for broad discretion when disciplining and controlling the child;26 (3) the similarity between parental immunity
and the already-existing interspousal immunity;27 (4) the need
for protection against fraud or collusion between the parent and
child; 28 (5) the fact that, through inheritance, a parent would
ultimately procure the damages paid to the child after the child's
death;2" and (6) the fear that the child would ultimately suffer
from the exhaustion of the family's financial resources because of
the parent's litigation expenses.30
Subsequent to the "Great Trilogy," a majority of states adopted the parental immunity doctrine.3' With respect to intentional

Rooney, supra note 3, at 1163.
26. McKelvey, 77 S.W. at 664.
27. Hollister, supra note 7, at 495.
Various reasons have been given [for why a wife cannot sue her husband],
but the principal immediate reasons were the incapacity of a married woman to sue or be sued generally without joinder of her husband as party plaintiff or defendant and the further inability of spouses to sue, or even to have
certain rights against, each other, consequent upon the concept of legal unity
of husband and wife.
William McCurdy, Torts Between Parent and Child, 5 VILL. L. REV. 521, 521
(1960). However, the notion of spousal unity has since been abolished by several
Married Women's Property Acts of various states. See William McCurdy, Property
Torts Between Spouses, 2 VILL. L. REV. 447, 461 (1957). Intraspousal immunity was
effectively abolished in Illinois through the passage of a statute. That current statute states in part: "A married woman may, in all cases, sue and be sued without
joining her husband with her, to the same extent as if she were unmarried. A husband or wife may sue the other for a tort committed during the marriage." 750
ILCS 65/1 (1992). Prior to 1874, women in Illinois were only allowed to sue their
husbands when the suit was necessary to protect their own property. Brandt v.
Keller, 109 N.E.2d 729, 730-31 (Ill. 1953).
28. Hastings v. Hastings, 163 A.2d 147, 150 (N.J. 1960). The New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged the danger in the possibility of fraud and collusion by
stating:
[Aln action is not going to be commenced unless the family member to be
sued is in effect prepared to say that he was negligent. The decision for the
child to sue will be determined within the family circle and obviously the
proposed defendant is going to participate in making it, quite an unorthodox
situation under our basic concept of adversary litigation, to say the least.
The risk of collusion is indeed a very great and human one, when the
insured's own flesh and blood and the family pocketbook are concerned.
Id.
29. Hollister, supra note 7, at 496 (citing Roller v. Roller, 79 P. 788, 789 (Wash.
1905)). The court noted that parents could ultimately benefit from their own
wrong. Id. If the child sued the parent and was awarded money damages, the parents would reacquire the money if the child predeceased them. Id. at 497; see also
WILLLAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 127, at 904-05 (4th ed. 1971).
30. Roller, 79 P. at 789.
31. Rooney & Rooney, supra note 3, at 1163. But see Dunlap v. Dunlap, 150 A.
905, 906-908 (N.H. 1930) (resisting the adoption of parental tort immunity). The
New Hampshire Supreme Court stated:
There has never been a common-law rule that a child could not sue its par-
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torts, almost all the states have since allowed a child to bring suit
against a parent. 2 However, over the years, states have greatly
differed in their approach to parental immunity in cases involving
negligent torts.
States 'have taken four approaches concerning parental immunity with regard to negligent torts. The first approach is the
retention of the original doctrine, completely barring any child
from maintaining negligent tort actions.33 According to this view,
a parent sued by a child could move the court to dismiss the entire negligent tort, claiming parental tort immunity as an affirmative defense.
The second approach is a partial abrogation of the doctrine
by which courts create exceptions to the general bar of immunity.34 A majority of states follow this piecemeal approach. 5 The

ent. It is a misapprehension of the situation to start with that idea, and
treat the suits which have been allowed as exceptions to a general rule. The
minor has the same right to redress for wrongs as any other individual.
Id. at 906.
32. See The "ReasonableParent"Standard:An Alternative to Parent-ChildTort
Immunity, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 795, 804 (1976). Most states, like Illinois, consider
a parent to have abandoned the family relationship when acting willfully and intentionally. Thus, the child is allowed to maintain an action in tort. See generally
Kobylanski v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 317 N.E.2d 714 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974).
33. The following nine states continue to retain the doctrine of parental tort
immunity: Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Nebraska,
Tennessee, and Utah. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Bishop, 720 S.W.2d 299 (Ark. 1986);
Coleman v. Coleman, 278 S.E.2d 114 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981); Pedigo v. Rowley, 610
P.2d 560 (Idaho 1980); Frye v. Frye, 505 A.2d 826 (Md. 1986); Pullen v. Novak, 99
N.W.2d 16 (Neb. 1959); Barranco v. Jackson, 690 S.W.2d 221 (Tenn. 1985).
34. The following 28 states have created exceptions to the general parental
immunity rule and thus have partially abrogated it: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572c
(West Supp. 1990) (abrogating immunity in actions against a parent for the negligent operation of an automobile, aircraft, or watercraft); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1539.21 (Supp. 1990) (abolishing immunity in automobile cases); Hurst v. Capitell,
539 So. 2d 264 (Ala. 1989) (abolishing the doctrine with regards to sexual abuse
cases); Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967) (allowing a child to sue a parent
for injuries resulting from negligent driving); Sandoval v. Sandoval, 623 P.2d 800
(Ariz. 1981) (retaining the parental tort immunity doctrine for injuries resulting
from parental care); Terror Mining Co. v. Roter, 866 P.2d 929 (Colo. 1994) (allowing a child to sue for injuries resulting from a parent's negligence while in the
course of business-related activities); Dzenutis v. Dzenutis, 512 A.2d 130 (Conn.
1986) (allowing a child to sue a parent for injuries resulting from a parent's business activities); Schneider v. Coe, 405 A.2d 682 (Del. 1979) (barring an action in
which parent is exercising control, authority or discretion); Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d
1066 (Fla. 1982) (allowing an unemancipated child to sue parent for negligence
only to extent of parent's insurance coverage); Cates v. Cates, 619 N.E.2d 715 (Ill.
1993) (barring actions concerning conduct inherent to parent-child relationship);
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Wisconsin Supreme Court created the most common example of
such an exception, allowing all actions in which the alleged tortious act does not concern the exercise of parental authority and
discretion in providing for the child.3"
The third approach is the abolition of immunity. States following this approach completely refuse to adopt a parental immunity doctrine in any form and do not in any way restrict a child's
ability to bring suit by any means.3 7 Thus, this approach bars a

Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786 (Iowa 1981) (allowing a cause of action if conduct does not relate to parental authority and discretion); Nocktonick v.
Nocktonick, 611 P.2d 135 (Kan. 1980) (allowing a child to sue for the negligent
operation of an automobile); Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1971) (allowing
a child to sue in all cases except for those involving exercise of parental authority
and discretion in childcare); Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634 (Me. 1979) (reserving
the consideration of parental care and discipline for the future); Sorensen v.
Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d 907 (Mass. 1975) (abrogating immunity to the extent of a
parent's liability insurance coverage); Haddrill v. Damon, 386 N.W.2d 643 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1986) (upholding immunity for conduct which involves reasonable parental authority over child); Cherry v. Cherry, 203 N.W.2d 352 (Minn. 1972) (abrogating immunity with the exception of ordinary parental discretion cases); Glaskox v.
Glaskox, 614 So. 2d 906 (Miss. 1992) (excepting automobile cases from parental immunity); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Royle, 656 P.2d 820 (Mont. 1983) (allowing a
child to sue a divorced, noncustodial parent); Foldi v. Jeffries, 461 A.2d 1145 (N.J.
1983) (creating a willful and wanton conduct exception to the rule of immunity);
Guess v. Gulf Ins., 627 P.2d 869 (N.M. 1981) (allowing suit by child against deceased parent's estate); Lee v. Mowett Sales Co., 342 S.E.2d 882 (N.C. 1986) (applying immunity only in ordinary negligence cases, as opposed to malicious acts);
Unah v. Martin, 676 P.2d 1366 (Okla. 1984) (allowing an unemancipated minor to
sue parent for negligent operation of an automobile); Silva v. Silva, 446 A.2d 1013
(R.I. 1982) (allowing a child to sue for injuries resulting from an automobile accident caused by parent); Jilani v. Jilani, 767 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1988) (allowing a
child to sue parent for injuries received in automobile accident); Smith v. Kaufman,
183 S.E.2d 190 (Va. 1971) (allowing suits by children who are under 14 years of
age); Talarico v. Foremost Ins. Co., 712 P.2d 294 (Wash. 1986) (upholding immunity with exception of willful and wanton conduct); Lee v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721 (W.
Va. 1976) (abrogating immunity in automobile cases involving parent and child);
Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963) (abolishing the rule in personal injury
actions).
35. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
36. Goller v. Goller, 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963).
37. The following four jurisdictions have never adopted parental immunity: District of Columbia, Hawaii, Nevada, and South Dakota. See Rousey v. Rousey, 528
A.2d 416 (D.C. 1987); Peterson v. City of Honolulu, 462 P.2d 1007 (Haw. 1969);
Rupert v. Stienne, 528 P.2d 1013 (Nev. 1974). South Dakota courts have not had
the opportunity to consider parental tort immunity.
See also Hollister, supra note 7, at 528-32; Harlin R. Dean, Jr., It's Time To
Abolish North Carolina's Parent-Child Immunity, But Who's Going To Do
It?-Coffey v. Coffey and North Carolina General Statutes Section 1-539.21, 68
N.C. L. REV. 1317, 1328 n.123 (1990) (listing jurisdictions adopting parental tort
immunity through 1990); Chanse McLeod, Note, Jilani v. Jilani: The Erosion of the
Parental Tort Immunity Doctrine in Texas, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 717, 718-19 nn.7-9
(1991) (listing jurisdictions with some form of parental tort immunity through
1991).
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parent from defending a negligence action brought by his child
simply by claiming immunity.
The fourth and final approach entirely abrogates the parental
immunity doctrine, but replaces it with restrictions on suits between children and their parents.3" Restrictions to replace the
abolished parental tort immunity doctrine are of two types.39 The
first restriction permits a child to sue a parent only when the
parent owes a duty to the child separate from the parent-child
relationship.40 The second restriction in effect replaces the immunity doctrine4 1 with a "reasonable and prudent parent" standard.42 Thus, in summary, the four approaches to parental tort
immunity differ greatly among the states, varying from strict
adherence to the doctrine's bar from liability to complete abrogation and replacement of the doctrine.
B. The Illinois Approach: CreatingExceptions
Illinois courts have taken the second of the above-mentioned
approaches:4 3 partial abrogation of parent-child immunity

38. The following 10 states have abrogated parental immunity with regard to
negligent torts: California, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina. See, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson,
479 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971); Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980);

Hartman v. Hartman, 821 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1991); Briere v. Briere, 224 A.2d 588
(N.H. 1966); Holodook v. Spencer, 324 N.E.2d 338 (N.Y. 1974); Nuelle v. Wells, 154
N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1967); Shearer v. Shearer, 480 N.E.2d 388 (Ohio 1985); Winn v.
Gilroy, 681 P.2d 776 (Or. 1984); Falco v. Pados, 282 A.2d 351 (Pa. 1971); Elam v.
Elam, 268 S.E.2d 109 (S.C. 1980).
39. See Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971) (en banc); Holodook v.
Spencer, 324 N.E.2d 338 (N.Y. 1974).
40. Holodook, 324 N.E.2d at 346.
41. Gibson, 479 P.2d at 648.
42. Id. at 653. "The [reasonable and prudent parent] standard is the traditional
one of reasonableness, but viewed in light of the parental role." Id. Thus, the court
held that the proper test of a parent's conduct is: "what would an ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent have done in similar circumstances?" Id.
43. The parental tort immunity doctrine was adopted in its entirety by an Illinois appellate court in Foley v. Foley, 61 Ill. App. 577 (Ill. App. Ct. 1895). "It is
doubtless [in] the law, that a child can not [sic] maintain an action for damages on
account of maltreatment against a parent, whether the relation is by blood or created by adoption ... followed by all the legal consequences and incidents of the
natural relation." Id. at 580. The court gave approval to the trial court's instruction
to the jury stating:
The court instructs the jury that if a parent, or one sustaining that relation
to a child, treats that child inhumanly or cruelly, so as to injure it in health
or limb, the parents are subject to criminal prosecution, and conviction punished by fine or imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term not exceeding
five years. But a child can not [sic] maintain a civil action for damages
against its parents for such injury. This rule of law, as the court conceives,
is founded upon consideration of public policy, affecting family government;
that is, that the child shall not contest with the parent the parent's right to
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through the creation of piecemeal exceptions."

Until recently,

Illinois courts have recognized six separate exceptions to the original doctrine of parental immunity." Then, in August 1993, the
Illinois Supreme Court created yet another exception, riddling the
immunity doctrine with a seventh exception to its general rule."
1. The Willful and Wanton Conduct Exception
In 1956, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the parental
immunity doctrine at the same time it created its first exception.47 In Nudd v. Matsoukas, a minor child alleged that his father willfully and wantonly drove a vehicle too fast for conditions
and, as a result, caused severe injuries to the child." Although
the court recognized that allowing the child's action might interfere with family harmony, one of the prominent arguments in
favor of immunity, the court refused to tolerate the parent's willful and wanton conduct.4" Furthermore, the court declared that
it was the role of the courts, not the legislature, to create the
parental immunity doctrine, as well as to modify the doctrine
when necessary. 0 Thus, although the court adopted the immunity doctrine, it simultaneously created the first Illinois exception,
allowing a child to bring an action by alleging willful and wanton
misconduct on the part of the parent."1

govern the child.
Id. at 579.
44. Illinois' version of parental immunity has gradually eroded by "the creation
of piecemeal exceptions to the absolute prohibition against parent-child tort actions." Grobart, supra note 1, at 313; see also Cummings v. Jackson, 372 N.E.2d
1127, 1130 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (Webber, J., dissenting). "Either the doctrine of
parental immunity should be abolished altogether or left standing intact. The
piecemeal approach, taken in the case and in Schenk, can lead to nothing but confusion." Id. "[Parental tort immunity has eroded] like the all-day sucker in the
hands of a small child until there isn't much left but the stick itself." Schenk v.
Schenk, 241 N.E.2d 12, 14 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). See generally Romualdo P. Eclavea,
Annotation, Liability of Parent For Injury to Unemancipated Child Caused by
Parent'sNegligence-Modern Cases, 6 A.L.R. 4th 1066, 1093-1113 (1981).
45. Timothy I. McArdle, Stallman v. Youngquist: Parent-Child Tort Immunity:
Will Illinois Ever Give This Doctrine The Examination And Analysis It Deserves?,
19 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 807, 808-09 n.6 (1986).
46. Cates v. Cates, 619 N.E.2d 715, 729 (Ill. 1993).
47. Nudd v. Matsoukas, 131 N.E.2d 525, 531 (Ill. 1956).
48. Id. at 526. Note that the Illinois Guest Statute enacted in 1985 precludes
any person riding as a guest in a motor vehicle from suing the driver absent willful
or wanton misconduct. 625 ILCS 5/10-201 (1992).
49. Nudd, 131 N.E.2d at 531.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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2. The "Beyond the Family Purpose"Exception
The second exception to parental tort immunity exists when a
parent injures a child while acting "beyond the family purpose."52 In Schenk v. Schenk, a father filed suit alleging that his
daughter negligently operated her car by hitting him as he was
walking on the street."3 Although this case dealt with a suit
brought by a parent, the case affects all intrafamily suits because
the holding focused on the scope of the family relationship.
In determining whether the father had a valid cause of action, the court noted that the parent's conduct which resulted in
injury did not "arise out of the family relationship [and was not]
directly connected with the family purposes and objectives."'
Since the father was acting as an ordinary citizen while walking
on the street, and this action was not related to any of his familial
duties, the court held that he had a valid cause of action.55 The
court explicitly rejected the argument that the suit would destroy
family harmony and refused to rely on the fact that the daughter
had liability insurance to make its decision."6 Therefore, Illinois
created the second exception when it recognized that a parent and
child could sue each other if the injury occurred beyond the family
purpose.
3. The Dissolutionof the Family Relationship Exception
Illinois courts created another exception to the parental immunity doctrine when they recognized suits brought by children
against the administrator of their parent's estate.5 7 In Johnson
v. Myers, the court found that "when the family relationship is
dissolved by death," the policy behind the rule of family immunity-maintaining family harmony--ceases to exist."5 Immunity, if
applied, would unjustly prevent an "otherwise valid tort action
from proceeding.""9 Thus, the court held that the family relationship between the child and the deceased parent dissolved at
the parent's death, and immunity did not apply.60 Therefore, the

52. Schenk v. Schenk, 241 N.E.2d 12 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).

53. Id.
54. Id. at 15.
55. Id.
56. See Ron Beal, "CanI Sue Mommy?" An Analysis of a Woman's Tort Liability
for PrenatalInjuries to her Child Born Alive, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 325, 338-40
(1984) (noting Florida and West Virginia refuse to consider the existence of liability insurance in a suit between parent and child).
57. Johnson v. Myers, 277 N.E.2d 778, 778 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972).
58. Id. at 779.

59. Id.
60. Id. But see Marsh v. McNeill, 483 N.E.2d 595 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (contra-
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court created the third exception to the general rule, the dissolution of family relationship exception.
4. The Temporary Custody or Control Exception
Illinois' fourth exception to parental tort immunity allows a
child to sue family members, such as grandparents, aunts and
uncles, who have only temporary control or custody of that
child. 1 In Gulledge v. Gulledge, two grandparents sued by their
grandchild for negligence argued that they deserved the right to
plead the same defenses that the child's parents could raise.6 2
The court, however, refused to extend immunity to grandparents. 3 In justifying its holding, the court stated that, while not
unsympathetic to grandparents, the persuasive force behind the
immunity doctrine diminishes when considering persons other
than actual parents.' Thus, the court created the fourth exception precluding family members who have temporary custody and
control of a child from using the parental tort immunity defense.
5. The Breach of a Public Duty Exception
The fifth exception applies when a parent injures a child by
breaching a duty owed to the public at large.65 In Cummings v.
Jackson, a child sued her mother for injuries received while in the
family's front yard. 66 The child alleged that the mother failed
satisfactorily to trim the trees in the yard, in violation of the local
ordinance. Unable to view the road adequately, the child walked
in front of a moving car and received injuries. 7 The court held
that, since the mother owed a duty to the general public to trim
the trees and "only incidentally to the members of the family
living in the house," the child's cause of action was valid. 8 Thus,
the court continued to create exceptions, making the breach of a
public duty exception the fifth exception to the Illinois parental
tort doctrine.

dicting the Johnson v. Myers exception by barring a suit sounding in negligence
commenced by two parents' estates against a child who was alive).

61. Gulledge v. Gulledge, 367 N.E.2d 429 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977).
62. Id. at 430-31.
63. Id. at 431.
64. Id.
65. Cummings v. Jackson, 372 N.E.2d 1127, 1128 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
66. Id. at 1127-28.
67. Id. at 1128.
68. Id. Another example of a parent's breach of a duty owed to the public is
shown in Hurst v. Titus, 415 N.Y.S.2d 770, 770 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979). In Hurst, a
mother's negligence resulted in a fire which burned a child. Id. at 771. Because the
mother owed the duty to prevent fires to the general public, the court found her
liable. Id. at 774.
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6. The ParentalContributionException
The sixth exception applies to a suit in which a child seeks
contribution from a parent."' In Larson v. Buschkamp, a car in
which two children were passengers, and which their father was
driving, collided with another car. The mother of the children
brought an action on behalf of her minor children against the
father and against the other driver. The other driver then filed a
counterclaim seeking contribution from the father. The father
argued that he was immune under the parental tort immunity
doctrine.7 ° The court rejected the father's argument and
analogized the facts to a previous case71 in which the court allowed contribution actions between husband and wife.72 Finding
no logical distinction between the two cases, the court concluded
that the parent-child tort immunity doctrine should not bar such
a claim since it neither disrupted family harmony nor infringed on
the rights of third parties.7 3 Therefore, the court created the
sixth exception, the parental contribution exception.
7. The Non-Inherent ParentalConduct Exception
Recently, the Illinois Supreme Court created the seventh
exception, 74 allowing a child to maintain a cause of action
against a parent for any conduct other than "conduct inherent to
the parent-child relationship.., such conduct constitutes an exercise of parental authority and supervision over the child or an
exercise of discretion in the provision of care to the child." 75 In
Cates v. Cates,76 a four-year-old sued for injuries sustained in a
car accident while driving home with her non-custodial father.77
While on the way to his home, the father negligently collided with
another automobile. 7' As a result, the daughter received injuries
and the driver of the other car died.7 s
The child, by her mother, ° brought a negligence action
69. Larson v. Buschkamp, 435 N.E.2d 221, 226 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).
70. Id. at 225.
71. Wirth v. City of Highland Park, 430 N.E.2d 236, 236 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
72. Buschkamp, 435 N.E.2d at 224.
73. Id. at 225.
74. Cates v. Cates, 619 N.E.2d 714, 729 (Ill. 1993). "The standard we have created is not, however, as extreme [as fully abolishing the parental tort immunity
doctrine] ...

but relfies] on an exception." Id.

75. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 729.
76. Id. at 716.
77. Id.

78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Since a child has no capacity to sue an adult, the child is required to sue
through his/her next friend. ROBERT M. HOROWITZ & HOWARD A. DAVIDSON, LEGAL

19951

Parental Tort Immunity

against her father."1 The father argued that the Illinois parental
tort immunity doctrine specifically disallowed his child from maintaining a negligence suit."2 The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of the child since the "purpose of the parental
immunity doctrine would [not be] served by applying it to the
facts" in Cates. 3
The appellate court reversed and remanded, concluding that
the Illinois Supreme Court had never adopted such a doctrine and
that the doctrine had only been "recognized," not adopted, by
appellate courts, as in Foley v. Foley" in 1895. Further the appellate court advocated the abrogation of the entire doctrine but
only partially abrogated the doctrine in cases regarding the negligent operation of automobiles and other motor vehicles.85
On appeal, 86 the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment in part by abrogating a large portion of the
parental tort immunity doctrine. 7 The court noted that the appellate courts failed to take into account the rationale of the
Schenk decision" when applying the "beyond the family purpose"
standard. 89 Instead, courts focused on the expansive language of

RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 74 (1984). Although states have created their own rules regarding the procedure for a child under the age of majority to sue, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure state:
Whenever an infant or incompetent person has a representative, such as a
general guardian, committee, conservator, or other like fiduciary, the representative may sue or defend on behalf of the incompetent person. An infant or incompetent person who does not have a duly appointed representative may sue by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem. The court shall
appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant or incompetent person not otherwise represented in an action or shall make such other order as it deems
proper for the protection of the infant or incompetent person.
FED. R. CIv. P. 17(c).

81. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 716. In addition to suing the father, the child sued the
estate of the third party driver and the construction company in charge of repairing the roadway at the site of the collision. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Foley v. Foley, 61 Ill. App. 577 (Ill. App. Ct. 1895).
85. Cates v. Cates, 588 N.E.2d 330, 335 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
86. Cates v. Cates, 619 N.E.2d 715 (Ill. 1993).
87. The Illinois Supreme Court used the Wisconsin's Goller standard as a model. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 729; see Hollister, supra note 7, at 512 n.151 (quoting Illinois Natl Bank & Trust Co. v. Turner, 403 N.E.2d 1256 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)). The
Illinois approach is similar to that of Goller in that it abrogates immunity except
for injuries resulting from conduct outside of the parental relationship. Pedigo v.
Rowley, 610 P.2d 560, 563 (Idaho 1980) (stating that Illinois has taken a similar
yet different approach by focusing on "whether the conduct arises out of the family
relationship and is directly connected with family purposes," instead of enumerating the exceptions).
88. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 724.
89. Id. at 725.
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"family purpose." 90 As a result, immunity applied to an extensive
amount of intrafamily situations simply because they pertained to
the family purpose.9 1
In response to the unclear definition of "family purpose" and
the growing number of immunity defenses allowed by appellate
courts in Illinois, the Illinois Supreme Court attempted to clarify
the already-existing Schenk exception by modifying the definition
of conduct concerning parental immunity. The adjusted standard
afforded protection to "conduct inherent to the parent-child relationship; such conduct constitutes an exercise of parental authority and supervision over the child or an exercise of discretion in
the provision of care to the child."92 As a result of this broad new
definition, many of the previous six exceptions to parental immunity overlap with the seventh exception.
After comparing the facts of the case with the newly-defined
standard, the court concluded that the operation of an automobile
was not conduct "inherent to the parent-child relationship."9 3
Accordingly, the court held that immunity was inapplicable. Thus,
despite the Cates court's attempt to redefine the parental immunity doctrine, problems still remain.
II. PROBLEMS WITH PARENTAL TORT IMMUNITY: A CRITICAL LOOK
The parental tort immunity doctrine is replete with fundamental problems. Although states, like Illinois, have attempted to
solve these problems, none of the purported solutions are completely effective. This section analyzes the efficacy of the popular
approaches. First, this section examines the defects of the Illinois
approach of creating exceptions to the doctrine. Next, this section
analyzes two current judicial replacements employed in many other states.
A. Problems With The Creation Of Exceptions:A Look At Illinois'
Approach
There are four problems with the parental tort immunity

90. Id.
91. Id.; see also Hogan v. Hogan, 435 N.E.2d 770 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (applying
immunity when children sued parents for automobile collision on the way to a
piano lesson); Eisele v. Tenuta, 404 N.E.2d 349 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (applying immunity to accident occurring on visit to a college campus).
92. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 729. "These limited areas of conduct require the skills,
knowledge, intuition, affection, wisdom, faith, humor, perspective, background,
experience, and culture which only a parent and his or her child can bring to the
situation; our legal system is ill-equipped to decide the reasonableness of such
matters." Id.
93. Id. "The negligent operation of a vehicle even when exercising visitation
privileges does not constitute conduct inherent to the parent-child relationship." Id.
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doctrine existing in Illinois. The first problem is that the current
doctrine contains an ambiguous definition. As a result of the ambiguity problem, Illinois' doctrine has a second problem, misapplication of the doctrine by appellate and trial courts. The third
problem with the doctrine is that present-day application is directly contrary to the aim of tort law. Lastly, the fourth problem with
the parental tort immunity doctrine is that the ambiguity and
misapplication problems already have and will continue to have a
detrimental effect on other areas of law outside of intrafamily
suits.
The first problem with Illinois' parental tort immunity doctrine is the ambiguous definition of immune conduct. As discussed
above, Illinois' newly-created seventh exception has drastically
altered the doctrine by redefining what parental conduct is immune from negligence actions by children. The new definition
incidentally affects conduct previously found to be immune under
earlier-created exceptions. It affords protection to parents when
they exercise "parental authority and supervision over the child or
an exercise of discretion in the provision of care to the child."94
Due to the vague and excessively broad definition, the circumstances in which immunity is still applicable are difficult to determine. As such, the definition gives little or no direction to judges
and juries. Thus, the court's effort to clarify the earlier "beyond
the purpose" exception 95 was to no avail; the exception is still
ambiguous. In fact, the ambiguous definition has lead to another
problem with the parental tort immunity doctrine.
A second problem is the misapplication of the doctrine as a
result of the ambiguity. Since the method of creating exceptions
results in varied application in a case-by-case basis, the court
affords immunity to undeserving, negligent parents. Simultaneously, the court bars deserving children from seeking compensation for an injury.
Admittedly, there are certain circumstances where a child
deserves a remedy as a result of a parent's negligence.96 Unfortunately, the exceptions to the immunity doctrine do not always
allow a child to sue in these circumstances. 97 Instead, the courts
have allowed a child the right to sue in very specific instances,
such as when an injury results from automobile accidents, since
the activity is outside of the family purpose.98 To demonstrate

94. Id.

95. Id.
96. See infra notes 99-105 and accompanying text for a discussion of several
states' different approaches to the problem.
97. See infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text for a discussion of varying
holdings barring children from suing parental figures.
98. Schenk v. Schenk, 241 N.E.2d 12, 15 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
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how the ambiguity and consequent misapplication has lead to
inequitable results, one need only look at the doctrine's effect in
similar cases.
For example, there are instances in which these exceptions
could conflict with other duties placed on a parent. One such instance is when a child is injured as a result of an automobile
collision while on the way to a school bus stop. 9 Assume that
the child lives far from the stop, it is torrentially raining, and the
parent is left with two alternatives: drive the child to the bus stop
or keep the child home from the school. Further assume that the
parent is unmarried and must miss work to babysit the child if
she chooses the latter alternative. The parent has an undeniable
duty to ensure proper education for the child.' 00 Further, the
parent has a duty to support the child financially. 10' Considering these two duties, the parent decides to drive the child to the
bus stop on the way to work. On the way to the bus stop, an automobile accident occurs.
In most states, as in Illinois, the parent is not immune because the negligent driving of a parent is an exception to immunity since it is outside the parent-child relationship. 0 2 Thus, a
99. This example is a modified version of a previously-used example. The original is found in The "ReasonableParent Standard":An Alternative to Parent-Child
Tort Immunity, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 795, 804 (1976).
100. HOROWITZ & DAVIDSON, supra note 80, at 276.
The state's interest in assuring that its citizens are educated may lead to intervention when it is determined that parental conduct is interfering with a
child's education, either directly or indirectly. State intervention due to
educational problems most frequently occurs when a parent permits a child
to be excessively truant from school (i.e., knows of the child's attendance
problem but does little or nothing to help change the child's behavior); refuses to enroll a child of mandatory school-attendance age in a state-approved or otherwise adequate educational program; causes a child to miss
numerous school days; or refuses to allow a child to receive recommended
remedial services.
Id.
101. See 305 ILCS 5/10-2 (1992) (requiring all financially able parents to support
children); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(1)(a) (West 1995) (acknowledging a
parent's duty to support a child even after the parent loses custody of a child); MD.
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 12-202(a)(2) (1994) (noting that a "parent owes a duty of
support" towards the child); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209, § 30 (West 1974);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722 (West 1994) ("establish[ing] rights and duties to
provide support for a child [even] after the child reaches the age of majority under
certain circumstances"); N.J. REV. STAT. § 9:2-4 (1982); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 32
(McKinney 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3103.03 (Anderson 1982); HOROWITZ &
DAVIDSON, supra note 80, at 12.
In some states, the burden of financially supporting a child has also been
placed on step-parents, and others standing in loco parentis to the child. Id. at 13.
Every state makes criminal the willful failure to support a child. Id. at 22. However, courts rarely jail parents who do not comply with the specific statutes requiring them to support the child. Id.
102. Schenk, 241 N.E.2d at 15. "Itseems thus clear to us that reason and justice
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child has the right to sue the parent. 103 As a result, the parent's
discretionary judgment to drive the child to the bus stop in fulfillment of the duties to support and provide education is secondguessed by the courts.' °4 It is in these exact circumstances that
immunity should, if ever, apply. Instead, the Illinois practice of
creating exceptions allows a child to sue in those very same circumstances and in other instances protects parents who are undeserving of immunity. 105
The third problem is that the retention of immunity is both
unjustifiable and contrary to the purpose of tort law.'0 6 The Illinois Supreme Court in Cates correctly discounted the most common justifications for the necessity of parental tort immunity. Yet,
contrary to this reasoning, as well as the very purpose of tort law,
the court opted to retain immunity in particular circumstances.
The Illinois Supreme Court in Cates addressed two rationales
frequently given in defense of parental immunity: the need to
preserve family harmony and the need to dissuade fraud and
collusion.'0 7 In addressing the first rationale, the court recognized that Illinois does not allow immunity when a family relationship dissolves since no family harmony can possibly be present.' Os Furthermore, the court noted that it was the injury for
which the child sought recovery that actually caused the division
of a family relationship, not the lawsuit.0 9 In fact, the court
stated that the outcome of such a lawsuit may even reconcile
problems between parent and child by providing a remedy for the
misconduct."0 Thus, the court properly concluded that allowing

require that the immunity rule should not stand as an insuperable bar to redress
for injuries occasioned by the exercise of those [individual] rights [of a child]." Id.;
see Cates v. Cates, 619 N.E.2d 715, 725 (Ill. 1993) (noting that the Schenk court
intended to allow automobile negligence actions between parent and child).
103. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 725.
104. Since the court must determine whether or not immunity would apply, it
would necessarily have to determine arbitrarily whether the conduct is an exercise
of authority or ordinary parental discretion. Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648, 653
(Cal. 1971). See Frederick W. Grimm, Recent Development, Tort-ParentalImmunity-Merrick v. Sutterlin, 56 WASH. L. REV. 319, 334 (1981) (stating "[tihe only
way the courts can avoid a quagmire caused by tenuous distinctions and confusing
holdings is to abrogate the doctrine of parental tort immunity entirely").
105. See, e.g., Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 726-27.
106. See Grobart, supra note 1, at 307 (stating that "Ithe theory that an uncompensated tort preserves family tranquility and respect for the parent, even in a
family in which rape, brutal beatings or other inhumane treatment have already
occurred, is wholly untenable.").
107. Id.
108. Id. at 326; see also The "Reasonable Parent Standard": An Alternative to
Parent-ChildTort Immunity, supra note 98, at 804.
109. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 727; see also Hollister, supra note 7, at 502; Rooney &
Rooney, supra note 3, at 1169.
110. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 727.
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a child the right to maintain an action may promote, not destroy,
family harmony."'
In rejecting the argument that allowing a suit would disrupt
family harmony, the court also recognized that liability insurance 112 exists in the majority of parent-child disputes."' Thus,
the "real" defendant is the insurance company. 4 Accordingly,
the parent and child are "only nominally adverse" in this situation. "' 5 Moreover, the court noted that liability insurance is often a prerequisite to the filing of a suit; a child will rarely sue a
parent without insurance." 6 Therefore, Cates correctly recognized that the family harmony rationale was no longer justified.
Similarly, the court rejected the second rationale, the fear of
collusion and fraud." 7 The court stated that the legal system
has adequate measures to rid itself of frivolous and meritless

111. Id. In addressing the same "family harmony" argument with respect to
intraspousal immunity, Dean William Prosser stated:
The chief reason relied upon by all these courts, however, is that personal
tort actions between husband and wife would disrupt and destroy peace and
harmony of the home, which is against the policy of the law. This is on the
bald theory that after a husband has beaten his wife, there is a state of
peace and harmony left to be disturbed; and that if she is sufficiently injured
or angry to sue him for it, she will be soothed and deterred from reprisals by
denying her the legal remedy-and this even though she has left him or divorced him for that very ground, and although the same courts refuse to find
any disruption of domestic tranquility if she sues him for a tort to her property, or brings a criminal prosecution against him.
PROSSER, supra note 29, at 863.
112. The finding of liability has no relation to the existence of liability insurance.
Wilkocz v. Wilkocz, 464 N.E.2d 1232, 1238 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); Hogan v. Hogan,
435 N.E.2d 770, 772 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); Schenk v. Schenk, 241 N.E.2d 12, 14 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1968).
113. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 727.
114. Id. The Illinois Appellate Court in Stallman v. Youngquist stated:
Where insurance exists, the domestic tranquility argument is hollow; in reality the sought after litigation is note between child and parent but between child and parent's insurance carrier. Far from being a potential source
of disharmony, the action is more likely to preserve the family unit in pursuit of a common goal-the easing of family financial difficulties stemming
from the child's injuries.
Stallman v. Youngquist, 504 N.E.2d 920, 926 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987), rev'd, 531 N.E.2d
355 (Ill. 1988).
115. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 727. "Itis now generally recognized that the existence
of liability insurance eliminates the actual adversity of parent and child in negligence actions." Id.; see Grobart, supra note 1, at 322 (noting that the existence of
immunity, although beneficial to the parent as well as the child, should not preclude the child from just compensation); see, e.g., Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 611
P.2d 135, 142 (Kan. 1980); Sorensen v. Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d 907, 915 (Mass.
1975).
116. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 727; see also Winn v. Gilroy, 681 P.2d 776, 784 (Or.
1984).
117. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 727.
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suits."' Moreover, the court recognized that these problems are
apparent in all areas of law, not just in suits between parents and
children.' 19 Thus, the small possibility that collusion and fraud
might occur between parties is not an adequate justification to
preclude all children from recovery due to a parent's negligent
conduct. 20 Therefore, the Cates court properly rejected the two
common rationales which support the parental tort immunity
doctrine.
Although the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the two most
common justifications for parental immunity,' 2' the court conveniently retained immunity when certain conduct fits within its
ambiguous definition. 2 Thus, a parent may still act negligently
without having to remedy the situation. 123 Parents must simply
define the alleged tortious conduct as that which will fit within
the ambiguous and excessively broad definition; 24 as long as
they characterize their conduct as supervision or authority over a
child, they are given full permission to act negligently toward
their children. 125 In short, parental immunity rewards a parent
for misconduct and prevents a child from recovering for its injuries. 26

118. Id.
119. Hollister, supra note 7, at 501. "A rule which seeks to incidentally attack
fraud by withholding legal protection for all claimants, regardless of the justice of
their claims, 'employs a medieval technique which, however satisfying it may be to
defendants,... is scarcely in keeping with the acknowledged function of a modern
legal system.' " Id. (quoting Leflar and Sanders, Mental Suffering and its Consequence-Arkansas Law, 7 U. ARK. L. ScH. BULL. 43, 60 (1939)). Similarly, in Klein
v. Klein, the California Supreme Court stated:
It would be a sad commentary on the law if we were to admit that the judicial processes are so ineffective that we must deny relief to a person otherwise entitled because in some future case a litigant may be guilty of fraud or
collusion. Once that concept were accepted then all causes of action should
be abolished. Our legal system is not that ineffectual.
Klein v. Klein, 376 P.2d 70, 73 (Cal. 1962).
120. Klein, 372 P.2d at 73.
121. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 726-28.
122. Id. at 729. In rejecting the justifications, yet retaining immunity, the court
simply made a "distinction without a difference" which "places a foot in the door to
abrogate the doctrine of parent-child immunity .... ." Sumwalt v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
466 N.E.2d 544, 547 (Ohio 1984) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
123. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 729.
124. Id.
125. Grobart, supra note 1, at 321. "There is no viable rationale for allowing a
parent to act with impunity toward his child merely because the parent's conduct
may be described as the exercise of 'parental authority' or 'ordinary discretion'." Id.
126. But see Lemmen v. Servais, 158 N.W.2d 341, 344 (Wis. 1968).
[Immunity] . .. is accorded the parent, not because he [or she] is a parent,
but because as a parent he [or she] pursues a course within the family constellation which society exacts of him [or her] and which is beneficial to the
state. The parental nonliability is not ... a reward, but.., a means of en-
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This outcome is antithetical to the very purpose of tort law.
The aim of tort law is to provide a remedy to those injured, including children, and to deter members of our society, including
parents, from wrongdoing.'2 7 The current parental tort immunity doctrine does not accomplish this aim; it neither acts as a deterrent nor provides an adequate remedy.
Since a parent is not liable for any negligence when supervising or caring for a child, the parent has little incentive to exercise
ordinary and reasonable care. However, our society expects all
other members to exercise ordinary and reasonable care towards
that same child. 2 s If any other person negligently caused injury
to a child for a failure to supervise, he or she would be held liable.'29 By allowing the parent to escape liability under parental
immunity, the parent has little deterrent from acting in a negligent and injurious way.
Moreover, by shielding a parent from judicial accountability
in certain circumstances, a child loses the right to a remedy from
the parent."' Had a third person, not a parent, proximately
caused the injury, the child could recover damages."' However,
since a parent negligently caused the injury and no liability exists,
no recovery can be made. Therefore, the result is contrary to the
purpose of tort law.
Finally, a fourth problem is that the problems with the immunity doctrine detrimentally affect areas other than parent-child
situations. The ambiguous definition and continual misapplication
of the doctrine has already had an effect on several other type of
suits, not simply actions between a child and parent. Immunity

abling the ...

discharge [ofl duties which society exacts.

Id.
127. PROSSER, supra note 29, § 2, at 6 (defining the law of torts as "a body of law
which is directed toward the compensation of individuals, rather than the public,
for losses which they have suffered in respect of all their legally recognized interests, rather than one interest only, where the law considers compensation is required").
128. Cynthia Ann Tolch, Note, Will Junior's First Words Be "I'll See You In
Court!"?, 58 MO. L. REV. 251, 255 (1993) (paraphrasing Hartman v. Hartman, 821
S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1991)).
129. It is important to note that immunity simply exempts a parent from liability in tort. WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 608 (8th ed.
1988).
[The immunity] does not deny the tort, but [denies] the resulting liability.
The immunity does not mean that conduct that would amount to a tort on
the part of other defendants is not still equally tortious in character, but
merely that for the protection of the particular defendant, or of interest that
the defendant represents, absolution from liability is granted.
Id.
130. Id.
131. See Hollister, supra note 7, at 524 (stating that "[tihe immunity sacrifices
the child in the name of protecting the family").
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from negligent tort actions pertains to all people standing in the

place of parents or guardians." 2 As a result, the immunity doctrine affects teachers,

33

foster parents, 34

and even the State

of Illinois." 5
A fitting example is a suit in which a child sues a teacher.
During school hours, a teacher is said to be in "stand[ing] in the
relation of parents and guardians."' Thus, teachers can assert
the same immunities and defenses any parent would claim as long
as the conduct took place on school grounds.'37
In fact, after Cates, an Illinois appellate court grappled with
the definition of "conduct concern[ing] parental discretion in discipline, supervision and care of the child" as it pertained to

teachers. 3 s The court held that immunity should only apply
when the teacher gives medical treatment, supervises the child on

132. See infra note 133 and accompanying text for a discussion of teachers' immunity when they stand in the place of parents.

133. Stiff v. Eastern Ill. Area of Special Educ., 621 N.E.2d 218, 221 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993), appeal denied, 631 N.E.2d 718 (Ill. 1994).
We find the Cates opinion requires a finding that teachers "standfing] in the
relation of parents and guardians" (citation omitted) can also be subjected to
negligence claims, except where the conduct constitutes the exercise of
teacher authority and supervision over the child, or in the exercise of discretion in the provision of care to the child.
Id.
134. See HOROWITZ & DAVIDSON, supra note 80, at 361-62 (explaining the relationship foster parents have with the natural parents, the children, and the state
agency); see also Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So. 2d 801 (Ala. 1992) (affording parental
immunity to foster parents standing in the relation of parents and guardians).
135. Although both foster parents and the individual state agency placing the
child in the foster parents' care are standing in the relation of a parent, the agency
is in charge of the supervision of the foster parents and as well retains legal power
regarding the child. HOROWITZ & DAVIDSON, supra note 80, at 362. In other words,
the state agency has the power to determine educational, medical and disciplinary
issues. Id. The foster parents are legally required to follow all orders given by the
state agency in charge. Id. Federal law mandates that all state agencies notify the
appropriate court or law enforcement agency of any child abuse of neglect taking
place in any residence or agency building receiving funds for foster care. Id.; see 42
U.S.C. § 671(a)(9) (requiring state agencies to notify particular agencies of any
forms of child abuse occurring in federally funded programs).
136. Stiff, 621 N.E.2d at 221; see also 105 ILCS 5/24-24 (1991) (granting educators the standing of in loco parentis as parent or guardian of students).
137. Stiff, 621 N.E.2d at 220 (noting the 1975 amendment of the former statute
included the language "including schoolgrounds ... used for school purposes and
activities").
138. Id. at 221. This case involved a handicapped student who was injured when
falling from a bridge. Id. at 219. The student sued the school district and teachers
for failing properly to supervise her. Id. The court determined it would have to interpret the recent Cates case and apply the holding to the statute according teachers the standing of parents and guardians. Id. at 221. The court held that the
teachers were immune from any liability as a result of ordinary negligence. Id. at
222.
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the playground, on school outings, and in the overall maintenance
of the classroom." 9 Therefore, the court created another list of
exceptions to immunity dealing particularly with teachers.
However, since an appellate court created this, it is not binding authority upon the Illinois Supreme Court or appellate courts
from other districts. Other judges may add, subtract, or completely change the enumerated list created in the previous case. Due to
this fact, there is still no one definition that can be given to judges and juries when deciding whether immunity should apply to
the teacher's conduct. A variety of interpretations of "parental
discretion" pertaining to teachers and all others standing in loco
parentis will follow and thus inconsistency will result. Thus, the
problems with the parental tort immunity doctrine are magnified
in that they affect negligence suits involving persons other than
those in an interfamily relationship. To solve these problems,
states should abolish the doctrine and implement suitable substitutes.
B. Current Judicial Replacements Employed By Other States
There are two current replacements to the parental tort immunity doctrine installed in state court systems. 140 The two replacements have opposite effects on the number of negligence
suits entertained by courts. One restricts a great42 number of
suits' 4 ' and the other allows a great number of suits.

1. The New York Replacement
New York has completely abrogated the parental tort immunity doctrine.'43 In its stead, the Court of Appeals allows a child
44
recovery from any breach of duty owed by the general public.'

139. Id. at 221. In clarifying "school outings," the court extended immunity to all
extracurricular outings, including field trips which "expand children's knowledge."
Id. "Any other interpretation of the statute would discourage teachers in providing
the best educational opportunities for their students." Id.
140. Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648, 653 (Cal. 1971); Holodook v. Spencer, 324
N.E.2d 338 (N.Y. 1974).
141. Holodook, 324 N.E.2d at 346; see also Kevin Fularczyk, Note, Parent-Child
Immunity After Carey v. Meijer, Inc., 35 WAYNE L. REV. 153, 157 (examining the
'spectrum" of different standards and approaches). The court in Holodook, after
completely abolishing the parental tort immunity doctrine five years earlier, stated
that a parent did not owe a duty of supervision to a child. Holodook, 324 N.E.2d at
346. Thus, a child had to allege a duty owed to the general public to maintain a
valid cause of action. Id.
142. Gibson, 479 P.2d at 653. The court abrogated parental tort immunity and
replaced the doctrine with the reasonable prudent parent standard.
143. Gelbman v. Gelbman, 245 N.E.2d 192 (N.Y. 1969) (abolishing all intrafamily
immunity).
144. Holodook, 324 N.E.2d at 346. "[Wlhere a duty is ordinarily owed, apart form
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However, the court expressly provided that the parent has no
legal duty to supervise the child. 145 Thus, any injuries which result46from a failure to supervise do not constitute a breach of du1

ty.

In Holodook v. Spencer, New York's highest court gave several reasons for its holding.'47 First, the court highlighted the concern that a negligence action brought by the child might place an
undue burden on a parent by restricting the parent's necessary
discretion in raising the child.148 Second, the court expressed
worry that a parent might not properly hold the money for the
child and use the money paid by a third party as a refund from
the amount paid by the parent.'49 Third, the Holodook court pointed out the fear that a third party would seek contribution from a
parent.' Because of the possibility of being impleaded, the parent would thus be reluctant to bring suit as a representative for
the child.' 5
Several courts have criticized New York's reasoning behind
the holding that a parent owes no duty to supervise a child.' 52
With regard to the first reason, the unwillingness to place an
undue burden on parents' discretion, courts argue that the judicial
system is capable of determining what parental conduct is acceptable and unacceptable.' 53 Parents must only confine their conthe family relation, the law will not withhold its sanctions merely because the
parties are parent and child." Id. In Holodook v. Spencer, New York's highest court
gave several reasons why the approaches in other jurisdictions should not be applied in New York. See id. at 344-48 (discounting many other suggested approaches
that are followed in other jurisdictions).
145. Id. at 346. "By contrast, the cases before us involve parent's duty to protect
his child from injury-a duty which not only arises from the family relation but
goes to its very heart." Id. Gelbman did not pave the way for the law's imposition
of this duty. Id.
146. Id. at 343. Negligent supervision has not and will not continue to be a tort
in New York. Id. The difference between holding that a parent is immune from a
tort action, as the parental tort immunity doctrine holds, and that a parent owes
no duty to supervise, as in Holodook, is significant. Grobart, supra note 1, at 320.
To hold a parent immune absolves the parent from liability. PROSSER, supra note
29, § 127, at 904. On the other hand, "[a] holding that the defendant owes no duty,
however, means that the conduct is not tortious." Hollister, supra note 7, at 517.
147. See Holodook, 324 N.E.2d at 344-48 (discounting many other suggested approaches that are followed in other jurisdictions).
148. The court specifically was concerned that a child, as well as estranged
spouses, might use a lawsuit in a vengeful or retaliatory way. Moreover, the court
was troubled that a parent's conduct would too easily be construed as unnecessary
and unreasonable simply because the jury would view the conduct to be unusual.
Id. at 345.
149. Holodook, 324 N.E.2d at 344; Hollister, supra note 7, at 520.
150. Holodook, 324 N.E.2d at 344; Hollister, supra note 7, at 520.
151. Holodook, 324 N.E.2d at 344.
152. It is important to note that the author has yet to see an article or case that
praises the New York Court of Appeals in the Holodook case.
153. Hollister, supra note 7, at 520. "[T]he judicial system has proved to be capa-
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duct to "ordinary care" in the supervision and authority over children; they are not required to exhibit extraordinary care to protect a child from all potential injuries. Therefore, no undue burden
on the parent's discretion exists.
In response to the second reason, the potential for misappropriation of the child's funds, courts recognize that children may
wait until they are adults to bring suit.'54 In a negligence action, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the
child reaches the age of majority. 155 Even if the child chooses
not to wait until she reaches majority and sues as a minor, the
court can withhold the money award from the parent for the injured child by placing the award in a trust.' Thus, the threat
of the misappropriation of children's funds is instantly eliminated.
Criticism with the third reason, the contribution factor, concerns the rights of children and rights of third parties. Under New
York law, the child will only recover if injured by a third party.15 7 If the third party can sufficiently prove that the lack of
parental supervision, not the third party's negligent conduct, was
the legal cause of the injury, the child may not recover.' The
parent, the very actor causing the injuries, could claim immunity. 159 Thus, a child has no recourse under this system if only the
parent was negligent. However, courts which disfavor New York's
approach argue that, although a parent may be reluctant to bring
suit if not immune, the denial of recourse to the child and unfairness to third parties outweighs the possibility of impleader.
Opponents criticize the New York approach because it not
only fails to address the needs and rights of the child, it also pun-

ble of distinguishing acceptable parental conduct from that which should not be
countenanced. The real need to recognize parental prerogatives does not require
that the courts permit parents to act negligently toward their children with impunity." Id.
154. Id. at 521. In almost every state, the statute of limitations for a child to
bring an action begins once he/she reaches the age of majority as specified by each
state. HOROWITZ & DAVIDSON, supra note 80, at 78. In Illinois, even if the child has
been appointed a guardian ad litem, the child may bring suit anytime before
he/she reaches the age of majority and until the statute of limitations runs after
he/she reaches the age of majority. Eiseman v. Lerner, 380 N.E.2d 1033, 1033 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1978).
155. 750 ILCS 45/8(a)(1) (1992). "An action brought by or on behalf of a child
shall be barred if brought later than two years after the child reaches the age of
majority. ..

."

Id.

156. Grobart, supra note 1, at 320. The Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, UNIF. PROB.
CODE § 5-424 (1969), which has been adopted in some form in every state, creates
a method for adults to transfer or give non-real property to children under the age
of majority. HOROWITZ & DAVIDSON, supra note 80, at 56; see, e.g., 760 ILCS 20/1
et seq. (1992).
157. Hollister, supra note 7, at 522.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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ishes third parties who injure an improperly-supervised child. 6 °
The third party may not, according to the New York Court of
Appeals, seek contribution from the parents. 161 This is because
the parent did not breach a duty owed to the child.' 62 If a third
party is only fifty percent at fault, that party must pay the entire
amount of damages since the third party cannot seek contribution.
But for the parent's status, the parent would necessarily have to
pay the fair share of the award. Due to the requirement that the
third party pay damages in full, the negligent parent ultimately
becomes financially enriched since the family is one economic
unit.' 63
Moreover, in a case where a third party kills an improperly
supervised child, the parents could bring a wrongful death action"M against the third party.6 5 In turn, the parents could

160. Id.
161. Holodook v. Spencer, 324 N.E.2d 343, 344 (N.Y. 1974).
162. Id. at 346.
163. Hollister, supra note 7, at 522. "[The family] is a single economic unit and
recovery by a third party against the parent ultimately diminishes the value of the
child's recovery." Holodook, 324 N.E.2d at 344; see also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW
OF RESTIUTION § 3 (1937); DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES §
5.15, at 414 (1973).
164. The wrongful death action was created by the Lord Campbell's Act of 1846.
Fatal Accidents Act, 1954, 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93; Stacey L. Ross, Casenote, The Parental Tort Immunity Doctrine Applied to Wrongful Death Actions: A Rule Without
Reason, Chamness v. Fairtrale, 158 Ill. App. 3d 325, 511 N.E.2d 839 (S.J.H. Dist.
1987), 13 S. ILL. L.J. 175, 182 (1988).
The wrongful death cause of action was adopted in Illinois in 1853. Id. The
revised statute states:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or
default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then and in every such case the person who or company or corporation which would have been liable if death had not ensued,
shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the
person injured, and although the death shall have been caused under such
circumstances as amount in law to felony.
740 ILCS 180/1 (1992). Justice Canton commented on the statute as follows:
This is a new cause of action given by this statute, and unknown to the
common law, and should not be extended beyond the fair import of language
used; but this it would be difficult to do, for the language is very broad and
comprehensive, embracing, in direct and positive terms, all cases, where if
death had not ensued, the injured party could have maintained an action for
the injury. This would seem to leave no room for construction, but refers us
at once to the inquiry, whether an action could have been maintained by the
child, for the injury, had he survived it. The act says, "then, and in every
such case," the action shall be maintained. To give a further limitation than
this would be, not to construe the statute, but to expunge or disregard a
portion of it.
Ross, supra, at 183 n.63 (quoting City of Chicago v. Mayor, 18 Ill. 349, 357 (1857)).
165. Hollister, supra note 7, at 522.
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recover the entire amount of allowable damages, even though they
were also at fault. Similarly, a third party that becomes injured
due to a negligently supervised child may not maintain a cause of
action against the parents. In New York, an unknown driver of a
vehicle who is injured while slamming on his car's brakes and
swerving into a telephone pole to avoid an unsupervised toddler
playing in the street could not recover from the child's parents.166 Since the parents had no duty to supervise the infant,
they in turn breached no duty, and negligence cannot be maintained. Therefore, New York's approach unfairly requires a third
party to pay a child for misconduct because the parent who is also
at fault may use the parental tort immunity doctrine as a shield
from liability. Moreover, the immunity prevents an injured nonparental party from seeking a remedy.
For the above reasons, the New York Court of Appeals' holding lacks rational justification. If applied in Illinois, the New York
approach would have an even more detrimental effect than the
current immunity doctrine. To hold that every other person in the
world owes a duty to a child except for the parents is illogical and
contrary to tort law. 167 It is ludicrous to declare that a parent
owes no duty to a child with regard to supervision and authority.' s Having a child is a choice, and with the privilege and
joy of having children comes moral and legal duties. 16 9 On the
contrary, the New York courts attempt to protect the parents
since the "enforcement [of the parent's duty to supervise the child]
can depend only on love." 70 In attempting to protect parents,
children and third parties will suffer. 17' All people owe a duty to
society at large to use 1a72 reasonable amount of care in all areas of
conduct and activities.

166. Id. A similar problem was addressed in Nolechek v. Gesuale, 385 N.E.2d
1268, 1273 (N.Y. 1978). A partially blind child was given a motorcycle by his parent. The child was fatally injured when riding the motorcycle. Although the court
stated that the parents did not owe a duty to their child, and thus were not liable
to the child for negligence, the court suggested that the parent may owe a duty to
third parties to refrain from entrusting their child with dangerous instruments. Id.
at 1274.
167. Dean Prosser described the losses which should be compensable in tort law
as follows: "The law of torts ... is concerned with the allocation of losses arising
out of human activities; and since these cover a wide scope, so does this branch of
the law." PROSSER, supra note 29, at 6.
168. Grobart, supra note 1, at 320. "It is paradoxical to hold that other relationships involve a duty properly to supervise a child, but that a parent does not owe
such a duty to his own child." Id.
169. Id.
170. Holodook v. Spencer, 324 N.E.2d 343, 346 (N.Y. 1974).
171. Hollister, supra note 7, at 524.
172. Rooney & Rooney, supra note 3, at 1178. "The bedrock of modern tort law is
the recognition that two people who have a relationship of some sort owe each
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The fundamentals of tort law support the imposition of a
duty to supervise on parents."' Liability is based on relationships with individuals or entire groups of people. 74 Historically,

states have affirmatively placed duties on the parent, such as the
requirement for education for the child.175 The Restatement (Second) of Torts acknowledges the existence of several affirmative
duties, not simply moral duties, present between parent and
child. 7 ' Legislatures and courts have created negative duties by
establishing and interpreting criminal statutes with respect to the
parent-child relationship.'77 Legal relationships, such as a parent-child relationship, establish even greater duties, including the

other a duty of at least reasonable care." Id.
173. PROSSER, supra note 29, § 2 at 5. "[Lliability in tort is based upon the relations of men [and women] with another; and those relations may arise generally,
with large groups or classes of persons, or singly, with an individual." Id.
174. Id.
175. Rooney & Rooney, supra note 3, at 1178.
176.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 895G cmt. k (1979).

177. Rooney & Rooney, supra note 3, at 1178. State legislatures have also enacted statutes making the parent financially liable for the negligence of their children.
See 740 ILCS 115/5 (making a parent liable for money damages up to $1000 to a
third party for the willful and malicious acts of the child). Foster parents and state
agencies are not usually vicariously liable for the tortious acts of the children to
which they are entrusted. HOROWITZ & DAVIDSON, supra note 80, at 101; see also
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-10-103 (1994):
37-10-103 Circumstances under which parent or guardian liable.
(a) A parent or guardian shall be liable for the tortious activities of a minor
child that cause injuries to persons or property where the parent or guardian knows, or should know, of the child's tendency to commit wrongful acts
which can be expected to cause injury to persons or property and where the
parent or guardian has an opportunity to control the child but fails to exercise reasonable means to restrain the tortious conduct.
(b) A parent or guardian shall be presumed to know of a child's tendency to
commit wrongful acts, if the child has previously been charged and found responsible for such actions.
Id. But see TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-10-101 (1994) (limiting the parent's liability to
$10,000.00). For additional statutes that relate to a parent's liability for the acts of
the child, see ALA. CODE § 6-5-380 (1975); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-25-102 (Michie
1987); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.025 (Baldwin 1994); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-13-2
(1972); MO. ANN. STAT. § 537-045 (Vernon 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21
(1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-43 (Michie 1994).
Parental responsibility laws have been challenged constitutionally in federal
courts. The challengers argue that their property had been taken without due
process in violation of the 14th Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. However,
.courts have identified legitimate legislative goals: the compensation of injured
property owners and the deterrence of juvenile vandalism." HOROWITZ &
DAVIDSON, supra note 80, at 101 (citing General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Faulkner, 130
S.E.2d 645 (N.C. 1963); Kelley v. Williams, 346 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. Ct. App. 1961));
see also In re Sorrell, 315 A.2d 110 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974) (basing decision on
both the compensation and vandalism deterrence grounds); Board of Educ. v.
Caffiero, 431 A.2d 799 (N.J. 1981), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1025 (1981) (making
a parent liable for a child's damage to school property).
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duty to rescue. 178 In states with distinctions between invitee, licensee, and trespasser, a child certainly is an invitee. 7 9 With
the status of invitee comes a duty to protect against unreasonable
risk of harm and to exercise reasonable care to protect against
danger.8 o Even in states that have abolished this distinction,
the landowner or occupant still has a duty to guard against and
warn others of possible danger."' 1 Proper supervision is a legal
18 2
duty several state courts have placed on a variety of groups,
such as schools, 8 3 grandparents,"M babysitters, 85 and Boy
Scout leaders.' "Negligent supervision 'if done by one ordinary
person to another'
is tortious; it is equally wrongful when engaged
87
in by a parent."

A parent should owe a duty to exercise reasonable care in
any situation with regard to their child. This is not to say that an
injury to a child is always a result of a parent's failure to conform
to the standards. The rules of negligence tort law should restrict
several causes of action; once establishing a duty owed to the
injured party, the injured child must show a breach of that duty
and that the breach proximately caused the injury.' Thus, a
178. Lindsey v. Miami Dev. Corp., 689 S.W.2d 856, 859 (Tenn. 1985). The
Lindsey court stated:
While paying lip-service to the common law rule that a stranger owes no
duty exist to render aid to another in peril, courts have recognized that such
a duty exists where some special relationship between the parties has afforded justification for the creation of such a duty. Thus, a carrier has been
required to take reasonable affirmative steps to aid a passenger in peril and
an innkeeper to aid his guest... [Tihere is now quite a general tendency to
extend the same duty to any employer when his employee is injured or endangered in the course of his employment.
Id.
179. "An invitee is one who is either expressly or impliedly invited onto the premises of another." Campbell v. Weathers, 111 P.2d 72, 76 (Kan. 1941) (citation
omitted).
180. "[Tlhe owner of the premises has a duty to exercise reasonable care in keeping the premises reasonably safe for use by the invitee." Barmore v. Elmore, 403
N.E.2d 1355, 1357 (1ll. App. Ct. 1980).
181. Moreover, the Restatement (Second) of Torts states that "[a] possessor of
land is subject to liability for physical harm [even to] trespassing children . . .
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 (1979). Even when children have been
warned of specific dangers prior to entering land, courts have held that the warning is insufficient to guard against injury to the child. See Shannon v. Butler
Homes, Inc., 428 P.2d 990, 995-96 (Ariz. 1967); Di Gildo v. Caponi, 247 N.E.2d 732,
735-36 (Ohio 1969); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343B cmt. b (1979).
182. Hollister, supra note 7, at 524.
183. Stiff, 621 N.E.2d at 221.
184. Oakley v. State, 298 N.E.2d 120 (N.Y. 1973).
185. Standifier v. Pate, 282 So. 2d 261, 262 (Ala. 1973).
186. Kearney v. Roman Catholic Church, 295 N.Y.S.2d 186 (N.Y. 1968).
187. Hollister, supra note 7, at 524 (quoting Holodook, 324 N.E.2d at 342; Gabel
v. Koba, 463 P.2d 237, 240 (Wash. Ct. App. 1969)).
188. William L. Prosser stated the elements of a cause of action sounding in neg-
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jury may determine whether the elements of actionable negligence
exist after considering the case before them."8 9 In summary, the
New York approach is ineffective and inappropriate because it
fails to recognize a duty of a parent. On the other hand, California
courts take a much more effective and appropriate approach.
2. The CaliforniaReplacement
Like New York, the California Supreme Court also abolished
parental tort immunity. However, California replaced the doctrine
with the reasonable parent principle. 90 In an effort to define a
duty owed to a child by a parent, the California Supreme Court
created the "reasonable prudent parent" standard: "[tihe standard
to be applied is the traditional one of reasonableness, but viewed
in light of the parental role."' 9' Thus, the determination of
whether the parent should be held liable for the alleged miscon92
duct is left to the jury, instead of the courts.
There are two criticisms of this replacement. One popular
criticism is that the citizens' views of the reasonable parent are so
diverse and different that a general standard would not apply to
all cases.'9 3 The New York Court of Appeals stated that
"[considering the different economic, educational, cultural, ethnic
and religious backgrounds which must prevail, there are so many
combinations and permutations of parent-child relationships that
may result that the search for a standard would necessarily be in
vain."'9 4 A second criticism is that applying a general standard

ligence, including the requirement of proximate or legal cause: "a reasonable close
causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury," PROSSER, supra
note 29, § 30, at 143.
189. Grimm, supra note 104, at 334.
190. Gibson, 479 P.2d at 653. In the Gibson case, a parent told a child to get out
of an automobile and onto a highway at night. As a result of the instruction, a
passing vehicle struck the child and the child sustained injuries. The child sued his
father for the negligent instruction. The California Supreme Court held that the
child had a valid cause of action and was not barred from maintaining the suit by
parental tort immunity. Id.
191. Id.
192. Nolechek v. Gesuale, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 1277 (N.Y. 1974) (Fuchsberg, J., concurring). Judge Fuchsberg set forth several suggested factors to be used in the
determination of liability:
[Alside from the facts relating to the negligence itself, such variable matters
as age, mental and physical health, intelligence, aptitudes and needs of the
child involved; the presence in the family of other children competing for
parental time and attention; and the economic, social and physical environment in which the parental conduct occurs, all may be expected to play a
part.
Id.
193. Holodook, 324 N.E.2d at 346.
194. Id.; see also Pedigo v. Rowley, 610 P.2d 560, 563 (Idaho 1980) (stating that
it is not possible to develop a proper standard considering the various ethnic, reli-
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of reasonableness restricts a parent's discretion of what amount of
discipline and authority is necessary." 5 These criticisms have a
single underlying theme: the jury system does not belong in parent-child lawsuits. 95
These criticisms are, however, without merit. The foundation
of the American judicial system rests on the belief that a representative jury would be the fairest trier of fact.'9 7 The jury is in
the best position to take into account all factors of the parentchild relationship in each particular case.' After comparing the

gious and cultural backgrounds).
195. The "Reasonable Parent Standard". An Alternative to Parent-Child Tort
Immunity, supra note 99, at 809. However, the reasonableness standard is "not
calculated to subject parents to liability for every mistake, but rather to subject
parental conduct to judicial scrutiny in order that clearly unacceptable conduct
give rise to tort liability." Id.
Justice Rogosheske's dissent also describes the defects in applying an objective standard to parent-child suits. Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 602
(Minn. 1980) (Rogosheske, J., dissenting). He stated:
First, the objective standard encourages parents to disparage the favored
American principle of freedom of choice in family matters by holding out the
possibility of an insurance recovery if a parent is willing to expose his conduct and judgment to public scrutiny. Second, jury verdicts based on a reasonable parent standard in this value-laden area do not inspire public confidence, since they would necessarily substitute parental judgments based
upon the individual juror's views of proper or ideal child-rearing practices.
The tendency toward arbitrary and intrusive standards of good
parenting ... cannot be alleviated by precise instructions ....
Moreover,
since the jury must consider the family context and the parent is the best,
and perhaps only, witness capable of expressing the personal, cultural and
socio-economic principles by which he raises his children, the danger of collusion is significant. These are not the type of claims our adversary system
of factfinding is equipped to impartially resolve, and the parent's incentive
for an opportunity to influence the result is so great as to further undermine
the process.
Id.
196. The common argument among critics is that the adversarial process will not
be able to determine the difference between a failure to conform to the parental
"duty" and simply not conforming to "normal methods." Grobart, supra note 1, at
324.
197. Reid v. Sledge, 587 N.E.2d 1156, 1160 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). "The weight and
credibility accorded ... testimony is best determined by the trier of fact who, having observed the ... trial, is in the best position to make such a determination,
and a reviewing court must grant such determinations great deference." Id.
198. Anderson, 295 N.W.2d at 599. The court stated:
We reject the contention that juries are incapable of rationally and equitably
deciding whether a parent has acted negligently in exercising his [or her]
parental control and discretion. Our system of justice places great faith in
juries, and we see no compelling reason to distrust their effectiveness in the
parent-child context.
Id.
[W~e constantly depend on ... juries ... to sift evidence in order to determine the facts and arrive at proper verdicts ....
Experience has shown that
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factors of the reasonable parent-child relationship, the jury may
determine whether a duty exists and whether a breach of duty
occurred. To reduce the subjectivity that inherently exists in any
jury trial, the court instructs the jury. 99 Within the instructions, the court reminds the jury that there is no one best method
for raising children and that reasonable parents may disagree as
to which method is the best."' Moreover, the court instructs the
jury as to what evidence it should consider and what conduct the
jury should determine as reasonable or unreasonable.2"' With
adequate instructions, the jury will adhere to a blueprint provided
by the court. This ensures that a parent's conduct is not automatically deemed unreasonable by a jury simply because it disagrees
with the techniques employed by the parent; a jury must not only
disagree with these techniques, it must determine them to be an
unreasonable exercise of authority. 20 2 Thus, "the reasonable parent standard does not prevent a parent from exercising ordinary
discretion in choosing the appropriate manner in which to raise
his children; it only provides an injured child recourse against a
parent who fails to provide the care a 'reasonable parent' would
have provided under like circumstances."" 3 Since the standard
allows a child recovery as a result of a parent's negligent conduct,
the standard is more equitable and effective than the parental
tort immunity doctrine.
However, there is one problem with the reasonable "parent"
standard. There should be no difference between the reasonable
parent standard and the reasonable person standard. "The question of what the reasonable and prudent person would do in similar circumstances is equivalent to asking what the reasonable and

the courts are quite adequate for this task. In litigation between parent and
child, judges and juries would naturally be mindful of the relationship, and
would be even more on the alert for improper conduct [exercised by the parent against the child].
Sorenson v. Sorenson, 339 N.E.2d 907, 914-15 (Mass. 1975). "It would be unjust to
bar arbitrarily the claims of injured minors deserving of relief solely because some
cases may involve possible collusion between two parties." Id. at 915.
199. See Fleming James, Jr., Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases,
58 YALE L.J. 667, 677 (1949) (noting several areas in which the judge may instruct
the jury).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS,

ILLINOIS

(1989), Ordinary
care-Adult-Definition; Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions §B21.02.02, Burden of
Proofon the Issues-One Plaintiffand One Defendant-Negligence and Wilful and
Wanton Counts-Causesof Action Accruing On and After 11/25/86.
203. Carolyn L. Andrews, Comment, Parent-ChildTorts in Texas and the Reasonable Prudent ParentStandard, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 113, 123 (1988).
PATTERN

JURY

INSTRUCTIONS

(CIVIL)

§10.02
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prudent parent would do in similar circumstances. " 2O4 A trier of
fact should always consider the circumstances of a tort case before
it, including the status of the parties. 2 5 A jury must consider
whether a driver of a car acted unreasonably in colliding with
another automobile, whether a security guard was reasonable in
the apprehension of a suspected shop-lifter, and whether a parent
was reasonable in slapping a child.
Thus, the defendant's status always replaces the word "person" in the reasonable person standard.2"6 In a case involving a
car driver, the question is, "What would the reasonable prudent
driver of an automobile do in similar circumstances?" In a case
involving a parent, the standard is the reasonable parent standard. A stranger would certainly be unreasonable if he or she
strikes a child; however, when a parent strikes a child, it may not
be unreasonable. 2 7 Thus, although the reasoning behind the California standard is rational and sensible, only the name is incorrect. The standard to be applied should be one of reasonableness; 20 the same standard to be applied in all negligence cases,
not merely those involving a parent and a child.20 9
III. PROPOSED REPLACEMENTS FOR PARENTAL TORT IMMUNITY IN
ILLINOIS: A STATUTE AND PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION

The doctrine of parental tort immunity can only result in
confusion and inequity within our judicial system. 2 0 Therefore,
this Note advocates total abrogation of the doctrine to resolve
these problems. Take the situation in Illinois, for example. With
its current doctrine, the Illinois courts have arbitrarily determined

204. Rooney & Rooney, supra note 3, at 1174.
205. Id.

206. Id.
207. See Rooney & Rooney, supra note 3, at 1174. "Spanking one's child is generally considered perfectly proper conduct for a parent (or one in loco parentis), yet it
would be almost always considered improper conduct for a stranger to engage in."
Id. "[A] parent may spank a child who has misbehaved without being liable for
battery, or he may temporarily order the child to stay in his room as punishment,
yet not be held responsible for false imprisonment." Gibson v. Gibson, 478 P.2d
648, 652 (Cal. 1971).
208. The reasonable person standard is the most adaptable and "amoebic" standard existing in modern American jurisprudence. The "reasonableness" standard
can be used in several circumstances. Grimm, supra note 104, at 335; see Burget v.
Saginaw Logging Co., 86 P.2d 1117, 1118 (Wash. 1939) (altering the reasonable
person standard to take into account a child's age, intellectual abilities, experience
and knowledge); Hanson v. Washington Water Power Co., 5 P.2d 1025, 1027
(Wash.1931) (amending the standard to consider what a reasonably prudent child
would have done in the same circumstances); Masterson v. Lennon, 197 P. 38
(Wash. 1921) (altering the standard to consider a person's blindness).
209. Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648, 653 (Cal. 1971).
210. McArdle, supra note 45, at 820.
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which conduct should be actionable and which are immune. 211
212
In doing so, the courts have in effect created public policy.
However, because the courts are not representatives of the state's
residents; the power to determine public policy and make laws
pursuant to public policy should rest in the legislature.213 Therefore, this Note proposes a statute regarding parental immunity.
By creating a statute specifically defining parental immune
conduct, the people of a state, like Illinois, through its elected
representatives, can convert public policy into law. On the other
hand, if a state chooses not to address the issue via legislation, a
jury is also correctly suited to determine-how much discretion a
parent should have, whether a parent abused that discretion,214
and if the abuse proximately caused the child's injury individual
circumstances.215 Therefore, this Note also proposes the use of a
jury instruction which employs the "reasonableness" standard.
A. Abrogation Of ParentalTort Immunity
Opponents of the abrogation of the parental tort immunity
doctrine argue it would create an incentive for children to bring
meritless and trivial claims against their parents. 216 However,
this argument is unrealistic.1 7 Certainly, the number of suits
filed by a child against a parent will increase after the abolishment of immunity. However, just as the abolition of intraspousal
immunity21 did not affect a large increase in suits, the increase

211. See supra notes 94-110 and accompanying text for a discussion of the history of Illinois decisions regarding parent-child suits.
212. See Cates v. Cates, 619 N.E.2d 715, 731 (Ill. 1993) (Miller, C.J., dissenting)
(noting that the majority cites public policy as a major reason for its holding).
213. Id. (noting that the legislature is the intended branch of government that
determines and codifies public policy, not the judicial branch). "[A]ny modification
or abolition of the parental immunity doctrine should be left to the prerogative of
the legislature." Hill v. Giordano, 447 So. 2d 164 (Ala. 1984).
214. See Grimm, supra note 104, at 337 (noting that the "reasonable person is
the personification of each court's or jury's social judgment after hearing the merits
of the case"). See generally CHARLES W. JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY 3538, 64-68 (1962); Tom C. Clark, The American Jury: A Justification, in SELECTED
READINGS: THE JURY 1 (Glenn R. Winters ed., 1962) (stating the jury is better able
to declare the societal norms).
215. Grimm, supra note 104, at 337. This determination would be in light of the
circumstances with which the parent was confronted.
216. Hollister, supra note 7, at 525; Tolch, supra note 128, at 260.
217. Hollister, supra note 7, at 525; Tolch, supra note 128, at 260. Even if a
great increase in the amount of suits filed would result, that fact alone should not
preclude modification and change of an inefficient doctrine. Fularczyk, supra note
141, at 167. The introduction of the theory of strict liability for defective products
resulted in a "flood of litigation, but the social policies supporting the doctrine
outweigh concerns over judicial economy." Id.; see also PROSSER, supra note 29, §
105, at 692.
218. 750 ILCS 65/1 (1992). The statute allows a husband and wife to sue each
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in parent-child suits may not be as drastic as some have argued.219 Since the Illinois Supreme Court abolished intraspousal
immunity, a very small number of suits between husband and
wife have followed. In fact, only two cases have reached the appellate level after the abrogation, and one of them involved allegations of an intentional tort.22 °
Moreover, the considerable costs involved in a suit will act as
a deterrent against the filing of frivolous claims.221 In addition,
the necessary elements required in proving a parent's negligence
will act as a barrier for meritless claims.222 Actual injury to the
child must result from the parent's alleged negligence to maintain
an action.223 Trivial claims that do not result in an injury to a
child cannot result in liability since the element of injury to the
plaintiff of a negligent tort does not exist. 224 Lastly, the American Bar Association acts as a final check against baseless suits.
The American Bar Association's Model Rules 225 and Canons of
Ethics

226

prevent attorneys from taking non-meritorious cas-

other for any tort that occurred during their marriage. Before the amendment was
passed, a husband and wife were prohibited from suing each other for any negligent tort.
219. Tolch, supra note 128, at 255.

220. Kim v. Kim, 554 N.E.2d 621, 623 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (wife suing husband
for alleged negligent operation of an automobile); Kukla v. Kukla, 540 N.E.2d 510,
511 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (wife suing husband for intentional infliction of emotional
distress and invasion of privacy).
221. Tolch, supra note 128, at 256.
222. Id.; see also Downey v. Mitchell, 835 S.W,2d 554, 555 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992);
PROSSER, supra note 29, § 31, at 143-44 (listing the elements of negligence and its
reason for each element). Other judicial tools, such as pretrial discovery conferences, perjury charges, the possibility to cross-examine, and summary judgment
motions, can be used to expose fraudulent or collusive claims. Jilani v. Jilani, 767
S.W.2d 671, 674-75 (Tex. 1988) (Mauzy, J., concurring) (citing Kirchner v. Crystal,
474 N.E.2d 275, 277 (Ohio 1984)); McLeod, supra note 37, at 732.
223. Tolch, supra note 128, at 256.
224. However, Justice Gonzales fears that, if the immunity doctrine is abolished,
attorney "runners" would quickly fly to the hospitals to prey on the injured children and solicit suits against negligent parents. Jilani v. Jilani, 767 S.W.2d 671,
679 (Tex. 1988) (Gonzalez, J., dissenting). But see MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (1983) (stating that a lawyer cannot solicit employment from a
'prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain"); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-104(A) (1980)
(barring a lawyer from representing a person with whom he gave unsolicited advice to unless that person is a former or current client, relative, or close friend);
ILLINOIS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (1990) (providing that a lawyer shall not solicit employment financial gain unless the prospective client is a
family member, friend, or someone with whom the attorney or law firm already
had a relationship).
225. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1983). Lawyers should
not assert a claim unless they, in good faith, believe it not to be frivolous. Id.
226. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1) (1980). Law-
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es. 27 Therefore, the opponents' fear of an increase in the number of suits is unwarranted. In the final analysis, the problems of
the parental tort immunity doctrine greatly outweigh the unfounded fears. Alternatives to the doctrine, including legislation
and a jury instruction employing a standard of reasonableness,
are discussed in the next sections.
B. Legislation

Some state legislatures have chosen to codify certain aspects
of the parental tort immunity doctrine.22 The author proposes
that states abrogate the doctrine by statute:
PARENTAL TORT IMMUNITY-ABROGATION

Parental immunity is no longer applicable in this state. All actions
between parent and child shall be adjudicated in the state court
system by the use of the reasonableness standard.
Most courts, like those in Illinois, are reluctant to defer the
issue of parental tort immunity to the legislature because the
doctrine is a creation of the courts.229 Since the courts created
the doctrine, the Illinois Supreme Court claims the sole right to
modify and interpret the doctrine "to correspond with prevalent
considerations of public policy needs."23 ° The only support for
the immunity doctrine in Illinois is public policy concerns.2" 1
Yet, the pronouncement of public policy legitimately belongs

yers should not assert a claim obviously intended to harass or injure another. Id.
227. See ILLINOIS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1990).
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an
issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which
includes a good-faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of
existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the
respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be
established.

Id.
228. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572c (Supp. 1990) (abrogating immunity in
actions against a parent for the negligent operation of an automobile, aircraft, or
watercraft); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (Supp. 1990) (abolishing immunity in automobile cases).
229. See Nudd v. Matsoukas, 131 N.E.2d 525, 531 (Ill. 1956). The Illinois Supreme Court stated: "[Tihe announcement of this doctrine [should not] be left to
the legislature. The doctrine ... was created by courts. It is especially for them to
interpret and modify that doctrine to correspond with prevalent considerations of
public policy and social needs." Id.; see also Cates v. Cates, 619 N.E.2d 715, 730
(Ill. 1993).
230. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 730.
231. The court claims that it ought not to be involved in parent-child disputes
since the parent and child are both "uniquely equipped" to handle the conflict. Id.
at 728. Moreover, the court addressed both the family harmony argument and the
fraud and collusion arguments. Id. at 726-28.
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to the representative body of the general public, the legislature.2"2 The courts do not have the resources nor the ability to
fulfill this duty efficiently.233 The legislature is better equipped
to make a fundamental determination of what the Illinois residents believe to be public policy.234 In this instance, although a
dissenting justice specifically noted that the judicial branch is illequipped to make public policy decisions, the Illinois Supreme
Court has assumed the legislature's duty of articulating the
public's concerns.235
Although the legislature is the more appropriate institution,
the courts do have the power and authority to create, modify, and
interpret the parental tort immunity doctrine.236 In the event
that the legislature fails to act,237 the court will presumably act
in its place. Therefore, in addition to legislation which abrogates
the doctrine, courts should implement a reasonableness standard
by a jury instruction as a replacement to immunity.2 38
C. A Jury Instruction: The Reasonable Person Standard
The substitution of the reasonable person standard in the
place of parental tort immunity solves the problems inherent to
the Illinois approach with its numerous exceptions, as well as the

232. Id. at 731 (Miller, C.J., dissenting).
233. Id.
234. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 732 (Miller, C.J., dissenting). "The legislature, with its
vastly different functions and resources, is better able to undertake a thorough examination of the different concerns that underlie a matter such as this. The judicial branch is not equipped to perform that mission." Id.
235. Id.; see People v. Felella, 546 N.E.2d 492 (Ill. 1989) (stating that public
policy declaration is to be made by the legislature).
236. Id.
By leaving the issue of whether or not to change the prevailing law to the
state legislature, or a[t] least giving it the first opportunity to act, all of the
populace's thoughts, opinions, and beliefs can be heard as opposed to having
an appellate court deciding the issue from a fact specific case. As is often
said, a hard case makes bad law. Allowing elected representatives the
chance to review and weigh the policies supporting immunity seems to be
the fairest method of testing the continuing validity of the parental tort
immunity doctrine. Of course, judicially created rules can be changed by
other judges, but given the conflicting rights and duties of parent and child
and third-parties, the legislative branch appears best equipped to handle the
task of outlining the contours of parental tort liability into the next century.
Rooney & Rooney, supra note 3, at 1181.
237. See Nudd, 131 N.E.2d at 531 (announcing that the legislature should not
modify or abolish the doctrine); see also Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 730.
238. Since the people of each state should be the ultimate drafters of the applicable statute defining which parental conduct is immune, the author refuses to draft
a model. Without input and feedback from the citizens of the particular state creating the statute, it is impossible to determine what the contents of the statute
should include.
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New York and California approaches. A representation of the
state citizens, the jury, would determine the liability of a parent,
as opposed to the courts.
An adequate and efficient addition to the reasonable person
standard is a special jury instruction given solely in parent-child
suits. Without the immunity doctrine, and with the addition of the
reasonableness standard, parental liability can be treated as a
question of fact to be addressed by a jury. The determination
whether the parent will be liable to the child only applies in 239a
case-by-case basis and will have no result on other decisions.
The jury will make its determination after viewing and listening
only to relevant information.24 ° In sum, the jury will "decide only on the particular merits and unique equities of the case before
it,"241 and determine whether the parent's conduct or failure to
act constitutes actionable negligence.242 With the introduction of
the reasonable person standard, the jury can be specifically instructed as to the correct standard to apply.243
The instruction will serve as a reminder to both the court
and jury that the standard of reasonableness should be "viewed in
light of the parental role."244 Through a combination of instructions given by the court, the jury will follow a step-by-step process
in the determination of whether the parent's alleged act is negligent and if the child is deserving of a remedy. Along with the
usual negligence instructions, instructions to the jurors will include what evidence to take into account, what duty the parent
owes to the child, what the definition of ordinary care is, the definition of "burden of proof," and what amount of proof the child
must show to meet that burden. Only after the jury complies with
the court's directions can a verdict be found.
This Note proposes that a court give the following jury instruction specifically designed for suits by a child against a parent.245 This instruction closely resembles Illinois' present pat239. Francis H. Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 111,
112 (1924). "The decision of a jury determines the standard for one case, and for
that case only. It has no force, binding or persuasive, in determining whether identical conduct under identical circumstances is right or wrong." Id.
240. James, supra note 199, at 677; Grimm, supra note 104, at 338. In order to
limit the jury, the judge rules on the sufficiency of proof offered by the plaintiff, instructs the jury, and rules on evidence. James, supra note 199, at 679-85.
241. Bohlen, supra note 239, at 116-17; Grimm. supra note 104, at 337.
242. Grimm, supra note 104, at 338. "A jury would consider the practical responsibilities, expectations, and limitations that flow from the parent-child relationship." Id. A jury is to be instructed that it should compare the parent's conduct
with the conduct exhibited by a reasonable and prudent person in similar instances. Grand Trunk Ry. of Canada v. Ives, 144 U.S. 408, 416 (1891); Chadwick v. Ek,
95 P.2d 398 (Wash.1939); Morehouse v. City of Everett, 252 P. 157 (Wash. 1926).
243. James, supra note 199, at 679-85.
244. Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648, 653 (Cal. 1971).
245. 305 ILCS 5/10-2 (1992). All italicized material in the proposed instructions
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tern jury instructions with modifications noted in italics. The
proposed instruction provides:
NEGLIGENCE: PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP

It was the duty of the defendant-parent,before and at the time
of the occurrence, to use ordinary care in the supervision and authority over the child for the safety of that child.24 That means it
was the duty of the defendant to be free from negligence in any

exercise of discretion in the provision of care to the child. When I
use the words "ordinary care," I mean the care a reasonably careful
person (in the exact place of the parent) would use under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence. The law does not
say how a reasonably careful parent would act under these circumstances. That is for you to decide. However, keep in mind that an
unusual child-rearingmethod does not equate to a negligent method.247 Simply because you disagree with the parent's choice of how
to supervise and exercise authority over the child does not justify a
finding of negligence. In order to find negligence, you must determine that the method, unusual or common, was an exercise of unreasonableconduct.
Also, keep in mind the unique, special relationship between a
child and parent. The relationship involves elements of love, trust,
confidence, and independence that must be exercised continuously by
parents in carrying out their demanding and burdensome duties.24 In some situations, an act by a stranger would necessarily
be wrongful, such as the striking of a child. On the other hand, the
striking of a child by the parent is not always a negligent act, as
long as the parent exercised "ordinarycare."'
Finally, remember that, although your economic, cultural,
educational, ethnic and religious background may be different from
25 °
that of the defendant-parent,
your decision on whether a reasonable parent would have acted as the defendant did should not in
any way be affected. If you find from your consideration of all the
evidence that the child has proved all of the propositions required of
the child, then your verdict should be for the child, no matter how
much the negligence of the child contributed to the injury. However,
if you determine that the child's injury was in no way caused by the
parent or could not have been deterred by the parent through the

are additions to the Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction designed for general negligence cases.
246. This language is directly taken from the opinion in Cates, 619 N.E.2d at
729. The language describes what conduct should be deemed "conduct inherent to
the parent-child relationship; such conduct constitutes an exercise of parental authority and supervision over the child or an exercise of discretion in the provision
of care to the child." Id.
247. This sentence, as well as the following sentence, is included to counteract
the "possibility of jury bias against unconventional child-rearing practices." See
Hollister, supra note 7, at 527.
248. Jilani v. Jilani, 767 S.W.2d 671, 677 (Tex. 1988) (Cook, J., dissenting).
249. Gibson, 478 P.2d at 652; Rooney & Rooney, supra note 3, at 1174.
250. Holodook v. Spencer, 324 N.E.2d 338, 346 (N.Y. 1974).
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exercise
of ordinary care, then your verdict should be for the par1
ent.'5

The above instruction reminds the jury of the uniqueness of
the parent-child relationship, as well as eliminates the affirmative
defense of contributory negligence on the part of the child. The
instruction reminds jurors that factors such as unusual childrearing methods and societal backgrounds have no bearing in the
decision of whether the parent was negligent. Also, if the jury
deems the parent's actions negligent, the child will be able to
recover, even though the injury-producing conduct was innate to
the provision of care to the child.25'2 This is due to an assumption that all children act negligently. Thus, the instruction provides that a parent has a duty to supervise the child to prevent

the child from harming himself or harming others. If the parent
breaches that duty, the parent becomes liable for any injury proximately resulting from the breach even if the child was partly
Therefore, the instruction disallows the defense
responsible.'
of contributory negligence. On the other hand, if the jury finds
that the parent exercised ordinary care, no liability exists. With

251. This instruction serves to disallow a parent from alleging contributory negligence. This is an alteration from the general pattern instruction used in Illinois
which instructs a jury:
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that there is no count
in which each of the propositions has been proved, then your verdict should
be for the defendant. But if, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that all of the propositions in any count has been
proved [by the plaintiffl, then you must next consider the defendant's claim
that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as to [any] count.
Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, B21.02.02, Burden of Proof-One Plaintiff and
One Defendant-Negligence and Wilful and Wanton Counts--causes of Action Accruing On and After 11/26/86.
252. Notice that all negligent conduct is actionable, even if that conduct takes
place in the provision of childcare. The author believes that the parent is responsible for the well-being of the child at all times and liability for the failure to act
reasonably is both equitable and just. Thus, the following sentences are included in
the instruction:
It was the duty of the defendant-parent, before and at the time of the occurrence, to use ordinary care in the supervision and authority over the
child for the safety of that child. That means it was the duty of the defendant to be free from negligence in any exercise of discretion in the provision
of care to the child.
253. Some states have put a cap on the amount of recovery by limiting the money damages to the amount of liability insurance coverage. HOROWITZ & DAVIDSON,
supra note 80, at 87; see, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 369 A.2d 669, 673 (Del. 1976);
Ard v. Ard, 414 So.2d 1067, 1070 (Fla. 1982). However, this is unfair to the recovering child. If the jury determines that the parent's negligent conduct proximately
causes injury to the child, why restrict the child from recovering the true amount
in damages? To limit the recovery to the amount of insurance coverage provides an
incentive for the parents to save money on premiums by acquiring only a small
amount of insurance.
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the application of the jury instruction the problems with the parental tort immunity are effectively resolved.
CONCLUSION

The historical expansion of children's rights is a welcomed
advancement in the American society. Children may now own
property and sue a parent for intentional torts.2 4 However,
there remains an obstacle in the children's road to equality. Presently, in most states, children may not sue a parent for some
types of negligence, including negligent conduct that is inherent to
the parent-child relationship. 255 Consequently, the present doctrine protects parents from liability and responsibility for negligent actions, yet punishes injured children by denying them compensation for their injuries.256
The problems with the parental tort immunity doctrine, the
ambiguity, misapplication, inequity, and adverse affects on other
areas, necessitate legislative and judicial substitutes. The state
legislatures are the correct institutions to abrogate the doctrine
and pronounce public policy regarding whether children can sue
their parents and for what misconduct they will be permitted to
sue for.257 Unfortunately, the state legislators, including those in
Illinois, defer the issue to the courts. 258 An appropriate judicial

substitute for the parental tort immunity in this situation is the
application of the reasonable person standard in all cases involving negligent torts. 2 9 This standard, in the form of the proposed
jury instruction, will allow a jury to determine the pertinent issues in parent-child suits.

260

As it stands now, the state judges

have assumed the citizens' role and continue to retain the parental tort immunity doctrine in some form. 261' Therefore, as it

254. Hollister, supra note 7, at 505.
255. Cates v. Cates, 619 N.E.2d 715, 729 (Ill. 1993).
256. See supra Part II for a discussion of the negative effects of the parental tort
immunity doctrine. '
257. See supra Part III.B for a discussion of the reasons for a legislative body to
determine public policy, as opposed to the judicial system.
258. See Nudd v. Matsoukas, 131 N.E.2d 525, 531 (Ill. 1956) (announcing that
the legislature should not modify or abolish the doctrine); see also Cates, 619
N.E.2d at 730.
259. See supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reasonable parent standard.
260. See supra Part III.C for a discussion of the author's proposed jury instruc-

tion. "It is the anvil of litigation, the heat of trial, and the collective wisdom of
twelve citizens which most effectively protects the rights and interests of all parties to a cause of action sounding in tort between parent and child." Andrews, supra note 203, at 126.
261. Cates v. Cates, 619 N.E.2d 715, 732 (Ill. 1993) (Miller, C.J., dissenting); see
People v. Felella, 546 N.E.2d 492 (111.1989) (stating that public policy declaration is

to be made by the legislature); Rooney & Rooney, supra note 3, at 1181.
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stands in Illinois, the doctrine can only be eliminated by the Illinois Supreme Court. Intervention by the court is called for since
"a judicial creation [such as the doctrine at hand] has become
outmoded [and] unjust in application."" 2 The citizens of Illinois
should call upon their legislators to make a change. Without
change, the doctrine will persist to unjustifiably deny children recompense.
Geoffrey A. Vance

3

262. Hurst v. Capitell, 539 So. 2d 264, 266 (Ala. 1989) (citing Lloyd v. Serv.
Corp., 453 So. 2d 735, 740 (Ala. 1984)); E. Russell March III, Casenote, Torts.Personal Injury-Doctrine of ParentalImmunity Extended to Foster ParentsStanding In
Loco ParentisFor Claims of Simple Negligence, Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So.2d 801
(Ala. 1992), 23 CUMB. L. REV. 483, 493 (1993).
263. Special thanks to the Vances and the Knittels for all the love, patience and
encouragement.

